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The music industry’s crisis response to the Internet has been 
the primary driver of U.S. copyright policy for over a decade. 
The core institutional response has been to increase the scope 
of copyright and the use of litigation, prosecution, and techni-
cal control mechanisms for its enforcement. The assumption 
driving these efforts has been that without heavily-enforced 
copyright, artists will not be able to make a living from their 
art. Throughout this period artists have been experimenting 
with approaches that do not rely on technological or legal en-
forcement, but on constructing web-based business models that 
engage fans and rely on voluntary compliance and payment 
mechanisms. Anecdotal reports of such efforts have occasion-
ally surfaced in the media. Here we present the first extensive 
sales-data evidence, gleaned from hundreds of thousands of 
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online voluntary transactions, from three web-based efforts over 
a period of several years. This Article examines the effectiveness 
of these voluntary models as compared to the baseline-forcing 
system advocated by the industry and adopted and enforced by 
Congress and successive U.S. administrations over the past fif-
teen years. 
Platforms for artist-fan cooperation are complex and dynamic 
systems, sensitive to a variety of design factors that can either 
increase participation and prosocial behavior or dampen 
participation and enable anti-social behavior. In addition to 
providing substantial evidence for copyright policy, our study 
reports field observations of the design characteristics that 
support cooperation. A growing literature experimentally and 
theoretically explores prosocial behavior that significantly and 
systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis characterizing 
most rational actor modeling. This literature has not yet been 
translated into a design approach aimed specifically at 
designing systems of cooperation. 
Building on experimental and theoretical literature in diverse 
fields of behavioral sciences, we synthesize a series of design 
levers that should improve the degree to which individuals coop-
erate. We then specify how these design levers might be 
translated into specific user interface features, describe the ways 
in which these design levers have been utilized in the sites under 
study, and present hypotheses about additional features that 
could improve cooperative outcomes. 
The Article contributes to the Internet copyright policy debates 
by offering empirical evidence showing that well-designed vol-
untary cooperation models compare favorably to more 
aggressive and widely criticized enforcement policies based on 
copyright law and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. It pro-
vides an empirical foundation for challenging the guiding 
assumptions of those policies.  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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Introduction 
Making a living as a musician has never been more complicated. The 
Internet’s near total eclipse of the media environment, along with ad-
vances in recording technologies, have drastically reduced the cost of 
recording and distributing music. As a result, more musicians than ever 
are able to realize their vision without relying on the mainstream music 
industry’s traditional filtering role. Meanwhile, the major record labels 
continue their long decline amidst falling CD sales and only modest suc-
cess with alternative models. Music fans are increasingly accustomed to 
consuming music without paying for it, via streaming content, 
downloading from file-sharing networks, or copying from friends.
1 In 
short, long-standing structures for artist compensation are collapsing at 
                                                                                                                      
 1.  See Jon Pareles, 1,700 Bands, Rocking as the CD Industry Reels, N.Y. Times, 
March 15, 2008, at A1 (“In an era of plummeting CD sales and short shelf lives even for cur-
rent hit makers, the [South by Southwest Music Festival] is full of people seeking ways to 
route their careers around what’s left of the major recording companies.”).  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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just the moment when new possibilities for production and distribution 
have emerged.
2 
In the face of all this change, both media companies and musicians 
themselves are cultivating new models for distributing recorded music, 
often bypassing established intermediaries to engage directly with con-
sumers. A variety of models have emerged, each seeking to monetize the 
dissemination of digital music, and in so doing, provide artists with a 
stable stream of revenue.
3 
Cooperative models—approaches to the sale and distribution of mu-
sic that rely on voluntary contributions and other forms of prosocial fan 
behavior—are beginning to appear in many different forms.
4 World fa-
mous bands and relative unknowns alike have experimented with 
cooperative models, authorizing fans to download music without paying 
for it, but appealing to fans’ sense of generosity, community or obliga-
tion in asking for voluntary contributions. Some artists are appealing 
directly to fans to raise the funds necessary for recording and distributing 
new material. Entrepreneurs have launched new business models de-
signed to harness the power of cooperative fan behavior, providing artists 
with platforms for engaging their fans’ goodwill. Indeed, the basic logic 
of the tip jar is emerging in many forms, with models evincing a range of 
sophistication and ambition. 
This Article analyzes three such models—Magnatune.com, Jonathan-
Coulton.com, and Sheeba.ca
5. All three enable artist-fan cooperation. 
Their approaches range from allowing flexible pricing schemes and volun-
tary payments to enabling fan-driven promotion and distribution. We 
begin by describing the range of currently operating cooperative models 
                                                                                                                      
  2.  For an overview of the broad range of new models for the distribution of music 
(most of them digital), see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New Architectures for Music: Law Should 
Stay Out of the Way, 29 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 259 (2007).  
  3.  For example, Last.FM and Rhapsody provide access to a library of music for 
streaming, and rely on either ad sales (Last.FM) or subscription sales (Rhapsody) for revenue. 
The most successful and well-known model is Apple’s iTunes online music store. A competi-
tor, eMusic, offers a fixed number of downloads per month for a subscription fee. See Most 
Frequently Asked Questions,  eMusic, http://www.emusic.com/help/index.html (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2010). Last.FM (a CBS subsidiary), an early adopter of the free streaming funded by 
advertising dollars model, currently provides a catalogue of over 3.5 million songs. See Saul 
Hansell, Last.FM Has a First with Streaming Music, N.Y. Times Bits Blog (Jan. 23, 2008, 
10:45 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/23/lastfm-is-first-with-streaming-music-
users-choose/.  
  4.  Business models relying on prosocial fan behavior are not entirely new. See, e.g., 
Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About 
Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 651 (2006) (identifying 
prosocial norms founded on notions of reciprocity functioning in fan communities associated 
with jambands (i.e., the Grateful Dead and its progeny)).  
  5.  Sheeba.ca was formerly an online music store run by the musician Jane Siberry. 
Siberry now permits fans to download her music for free. BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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for music distribution. Next, we describe the sales data from each of the 
three sites under study, and consider the extent to which these alternative 
models can be deemed successful—from the standpoint of the artists—
when compared against baseline industry revenues. After establishing 
that the revenues generated by these models are substantial, we then de-
scribe each site’s basic approach and analyze the ways in which each 
enables cooperation. 
Our analysis is driven by a recognition that platforms for artist-fan 
cooperation are complex and dynamic systems sensitive to a variety of 
design factors that can either increase participation and prosocial behav-
ior or dampen participation and enable anti-social behavior. That is to 
say, the success of cooperative models depends not just on music con-
sumers’ relative virtue; the models’ design features matter a great deal. 
What design features will work to increase prosocial behavior, and why, 
is not well addressed within mainstream economic theory anchored in 
universal self-interest. If homo economicus adequately captured human 
behavior, individuals would never pay for music they could get without 
paying. And yet, they do. To understand this behavior, we need a more 
nuanced model of human motivation and behavior. 
The past fifteen years have seen the emergence of a rich literature, 
across many fields of research, analyzing human cooperation theoreti-
cally, experimentally, and observationally. From this work we can begin 
to synthesize an approach to designing institutional, technical, and or-
ganizational interventions that harness prosocial motivations and social 
dynamics to the goal of sustaining human cooperation. 
By “cooperation,” we mean deviation from the predictions of selfish 
rationality in ways that contribute to the well-being of others or the pro-
visioning of public goods. Thus, to cooperate is to undertake a cost to 
contribute voluntarily to the provisioning of a public good—the creation 
and distribution of music. And by “public good,” we mean here the tech-
nical economic term: a good that is both non-rival in consumption, and, 
in this case, also non-excludable. In our case studies, the cooperators or 
prosocial actors are fans who contribute time and money to artists whose 
work they enjoy, even though they could get the music for free through 
other channels. In the case of the artists we study, fans could do so le-
gally, because the music is either entirely free and unencumbered by 
copyright protection, or licensed under a Creative Commons license that 
makes redistribution among fans legal.
6 The cooperation problem we 
study here is particularly challenging because there is no effective 
                                                                                                                      
  6.  For a general discussion of how such licenses work, see Molly Shaffer Van Hou-
weling,  Cultural Environmentalism and the Constructed Commons,  Law & Contemp. 
Probs., Spring 2007, at 23.  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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mechanism for excluding third parties from benefiting from the public 
good at issue, and there are no mechanisms to enforce reciprocity among 
contributors. 
We introduce a series of design levers that, based on underlying re-
search on cooperation, should improve the degree to which individuals 
cooperate.
7 We then specify how these design levers might be translated 
into specific user interface features, describe the ways in which these 
design levers have been utilized in the sites under study, and present hy-
potheses regarding additional features that could improve cooperative 
outcomes.  
As a matter of policy, our goal here is not to identify new legal rules 
or system design aspects intended to save the recording industry or as-
sure its revenue model. Rather, the policy question our analysis responds 
to is whether voluntary donations can play a substantial role in putting 
artists in a position that is not systematically worse, in terms of their 
ability to expect to make a living from their art, than under the old sys-
tem. Our tentative answer is yes: voluntary donations, particularly when 
the lessons of well-designed sites are refined over time, do provide a 
pathway for artists to keep body and soul together while pursuing their 
art. 
The Article’s main policy implication is to caution against blunt pol-
icy interventions aimed at “saving” the recording industry’s lucrative, but 
now obsolete, twentieth-century business model. 
I. The Emergence of Voluntary Payment as 
a Mode of Artist Compensation 
We begin by canvassing the range of cooperative models for the sale 
and distribution of music that emerged in the last three years alone. This 
Part does not offer a comprehensive review—new models are emerging 
all the time—but instead attempts to document an increasingly common 
phenomenon in the music marketplace.
8 
                                                                                                                      
  7.  The underlying research for these design levers includes Yochai Benkler, Law, 
Policy, and Cooperation,  in  Government and Markets: Toward a New Theory of 
Regulation 299, 312–23 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010); Yochai 
Benkler, Technology Policy, Cooperation and Human Systems Design, in The New Econom-
ics of Technology Policy 337, 343–53 (D. Foray ed., 2009); Yochai Benkler, Beyond the 
Bad Man and the Knave: Law and the Interdependence of Motivational Vectors (Mar. 12, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/ 
Intellectual_Life/LTW-Benkler.pdf.  
  8.  Many artists are testing the cooperative model waters, providing a robust variety of 
examples to analyze and compare. See, e.g., Kristen Nicole, More Bands and Musicians Giv-
ing Away Free Downloads,  Mashable (Oct. 9, 2007), http://mashable.com/2007/10/09/ 
radiohead-free-downloads/.  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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The most well-known voluntary payment model, unquestionably, is 
the release of the British rock group Radiohead’s album In Rainbows. In 
October 2007, Radiohead released In Rainbows exclusively (for a lim-
ited time) through its website.
9 The site permitted fans to select their own 
price for a digital download version of the album.
10 The sound files were 
not encumbered by restrictive code (commonly known as “DRM,” short 
for “digital rights management”), and fans were permitted to download 
the album for free (although a small service charge was required).
11 Ac-
cording to public statements, the band hoped to sidestep the bloated 
record label-wholesaler complex, but beyond the simple economics, the 
members of Radiohead also wanted to offer their fans the freedom to 
decide for themselves how much the album was worth.
12 After nearly 
three months, Radiohead disabled the download portal, and proceeded to 
release the physical version of the album in the traditional manner.
13 
Radiohead has not released comprehensive sales figures, and appar-
ently does not plan to do so.
14 Market research firms, however, have 
offered estimates. One report concluded that nearly two-thirds of 
downloaders paid between $5 and $15, with roughly a third electing to 
download for free.
15 The Internet market research firm comScore re-
ported a less rosy outcome for the band, estimating that 38% of 1.2 
million overall downloaders paid for the album, paying an average of $6 
per album (and an overall average of $2.26 per album, factoring in those 
who downloaded for free).
16 Estimates also showed that payment levels 
were highly skewed, with a relatively small group of fans (16% of 
downloaders) accounting for 80% of the overall revenue.
17 
                                                                                                                      
 9.  Jeff  Leeds,  Radiohead to Let Fans Decide What to Pay for Its New Album, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 2, 2007, at E1.  
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Id.  
 13.  See  The End of the Beginning,  Radiohead Dead Air Space (Dec. 5, 2007), 
http://www.radiohead.com/deadairspace/index.php?a=303. 
  14.  In October 2008, the band released sales figures from the In Rainbows release, 
including revenues from physical album sales and digital music stores, but declined to break 
down album sales by type (i.e., digital or physical), or by the source of the purchase or 
download (i.e., iTunes or Radiohead.com). Radiohead “In Rainbows” Sales Data Unveiled, 
Current (Oct. 20, 2008), http://current.com/entertainment/music/89428205_radiohead-in-
rainbows-sales-data-unveiled.htm. Aggregating digital and physical album sales, Radiohead 
sold three million copies of In Rainbows. The physical album release, in January 2008, en-
tered both the U.S. and U.K. charts at number one, even though the digital version had been 
available for almost two months. The album also became available on iTunes in January 2008 
and was the most downloaded album of the month, selling 30,000 digital download versions 
the first week it was available. See id.  
 15.  See Steven Levy, How Much Is Music Worth?, Newsweek, Oct. 29, 2007, at 20. 
 16.  For Radiohead Fans, Does “Free” + “Download” = “Freeload”?, comScore (Nov. 
5, 2007), http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=1883.  
 17.  Id.  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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Radiohead’s distribution scheme triggered a wave of media attention 
and scrutiny. Commentators wondered aloud whether direct artist-to-
consumer voluntary payment schemes could replace, or at least provide a 
strong supplement to, the music industry’s traditional forced payment 
methods.
18 Some deemed the venture a success, providing the band with 
a direct revenue stream and a per-album profit margin that exceeded by 
far what most musicians receive under the terms of a standard recording 
industry contract.
19 Many others, however, noted the large percentage of 
downloaders who paid nothing (of course, nobody knows exactly how 
many—estimates range from 33% to 60%) and concluded that music 
consumers are generally selfish and unwilling to contribute money to 
finance the music they enjoy.
20 
Rock musician Trent Reznor (the leader of the band Nine Inch Nails) 
and hip-hop artist/spoken word poet Saul Williams released a collabora-
tive record in the fall of 2007, employing a simple variable pricing 
scheme.
21 Reznor and Williams made the record (entitled The Inevitable 
Rise and Liberation of Niggy Tardust) available directly through their 
website, without the involvement of a record label.
22 Downloaders could 
access either a high quality DRM-free version of the record for $5, or a 
slightly lower sound quality version for free.
23 Two months after the re-
lease, Reznor reported on his blog that of the 154,449 people who 
downloaded the record, 18.3% chose to pay for it.
24 Reznor expressed 
                                                                                                                      
 18.  See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, Radiohead’s Genius?: Making Music Downloading Pay, 
N.Y. Times Board Blog (Nov. 27, 2007, 11:15 AM), http://theboard.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2007/11/27/radioheads-genius-making-music-downloading-pay/. Radiohead disputed the 
comScore figures, calling them “wholly inaccurate.” See Greg Sandoval, Radiohead Criti-
cized as Band Shuts Down ‘In Rainbows’ Promotion, CNET News Blog (Dec. 11, 2007, 3:12 
PM), http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9832659-7.html.  
 19.  See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, How Much Do You Think Paul Feldman Will Pay for 
the New Radiohead Album?, N.Y. Times Freakonomics Blog (Oct. 7, 2007, 9:53 AM), 
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/02/how-much-do-you-think-paul-feldman-
will-pay-for-the-new-radiohead-album/.  
 20.  See, e.g., Sheila Marikar, Radiohead Lets Fans Set CD Price, Most Say $0, ABC 
News (Nov. 6, 2007), http://www.abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/story?id=3826638 (report-
ing on market research data suggesting that 60% of the 1.2 million people who downloaded In 
Rainbows in the two weeks after its release paid nothing). But see, e.g., Gordon Haff, People 
Do Pay for Music,  CNET Pervasive Data Center Blog (Nov. 7, 2007, 5:31 AM), 
http://www.cnet.com/8301-13556_1-9812667-61.html (reviewing and criticizing mainstream 
media reporting that deemed Radiohead fans “freeloaders” and the In Rainbows experiment a 
failure).  
 21.  See Trent Reznor, Saul Follow-up and Facts, Nine Inch Nails—nin.com Blog & 
Media Archive  (Jan. 3, 2008, 1:04 PM), http://ninblogs.wordpress.com/2008/01/03/saul-
follow-up-and-facts/. Reznor and Williams have since removed the free download option, 
stating that the option was limited to the first 100,000 downloaders.  
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id.  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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some disappointment with the sales figures, explaining that the large 
percentage of downloaders that chose not to pay left him “dis-
hearten[ed].”
25 
Reznor’s better known musical project, Nine Inch Nails (“NIN”), 
structured their most recent album release differently. NIN offered the 
full thirty-six song version of their album Ghosts I–IV for download 
through their website, without DRM and in a high quality format, for 
$5.
26 NIN also allowed fans to access a nine song abridged version of the 
album for free, and made available a variety of higher cost limited edi-
tion physical copies of the record.
27 Reznor reported receiving 
$1,619,420 in revenue from 781,917 online transactions in the week af-
ter the Ghosts I-IV release.
28 NIN followed up with an entirely free 
digital album release (entitled The Slip) in May 2008, which Reznor de-
scribed as a “thank you” to his loyal fans.
29 The band released the album 
under a Creative Commons license, encouraging fans to download and 
share.
30 
Reznor continues to explore the possibilities of fan-artist collabora-
tion, converting the NIN website into a platform for file sharing, 
remixing, and facilitating fan-to-fan communication.
31 Fans have pro-
duced thousands of remix versions of NIN songs (all available for free 
download), uploaded photos, videos, and set list archives (over 30,000 
free photos and videos, all produced and uploaded by fans), and even 
volunteered as moderators to facilitate message boards and other website 
                                                                                                                      
 25.  Id. Chris Anderson, author of The Long Tail, found Reznor’s disappointment curi-
ous. He notes that Reznor and Williams earned more from the digital Niggy Tardust release 
than they would have from a traditional physical release. Reznor reported that 28,232 people 
paid $5 for the album, and the remainder downloaded the free version. That amounts to 
$141,610 in revenue. Williams’s previous record (released through a label in 2004), sold 
33,897 copies. Anderson points out that, assuming Williams’s 2004 release was covered by a 
typical record deal, he earned around $1.60 per album, for a total of $54,235. Thus, even with 
over 80% of downloaders downloading for free, Williams did well. Chris Anderson, How Not 
to Do a FREE Calculation, Trent Reznor Edition, The Long Tail (Jan. 3, 2008, 10:52 PM), 
http://www.longtail.com/the_long_tail/2008/01/how-not-to-do-1.html.  
 26.  See Order Options, Nine Inch Nails: Ghosts I-IV, http://ghosts.nin.com/main/ 
order_options (last visited Sept. 11, 2010).  
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Daniel  Kreps,  Nine Inch Nails’ “Ghosts I-IV” Makes Trent Reznor an Instant Mil-
lionaire,  Rolling Stone (Mar. 13, 2008), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/ 
13511/70878.  
 29.  E.g.,  Nine Inch Nails – The Slip,  nin.com, http://dl.nin.com/theslip/signup (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2010).  
 30.  Id.  
 31.  See Frank Rose, Nine Inch Nails iPhone App Extends Reznor’s Innovative Run, 
Wired Underwire Blog (Apr. 6, 2009, 4:41 PM), http://www.wired.com/underwire/ 
2009/04/trent-reznor-wa/ (“[Reznor’s] embrace of ‘freemium’ pricing, torrent distribution, fan 
remixes, and social media seem to be paying off financially even as they have helped him 
forge deeper connections with the Nine Inch Nails faithful.”).  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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functions.
32 To reduce the costs of delivering free digital music to fans, 
Reznor makes downloads available through BitTorrent, a web applica-
tion regarded by many other musicians as “the domain of pirates.”
33 
The independent musicians Kristen Hersh (of Throwing Muses) and 
Donita Sparks (of L7) launched an online project called CASH Music 
(Coalition for Artists and Stakeholders) in 2008.
34 The CASH site ini-
tially offered only Hersh’s music for download,
35 but many other 
musicians are now involved.
36 The site makes music downloads available 
in several DRM-free formats, and permits downloaders to pay whatever 
they want for music (set at a $3 default price and presented on the CASH 
site as an optional “one-time contribution”), album artwork, and liner 
notes, or in the alternative, to download for free.
37 Hersh has also made 
the original sound files for each song available to enable more techni-
cally adept fans to produce remixed versions of her songs.
38 The music 
on Hersh’s CASH site is offered to fans under a Creative Commons li-
cense permitting fans to copy, distribute, and alter the works, as long as 
they provide attribution and refrain from using the work for a commer-
cial purpose.
39 
Singer-songwriter Jill Sobule, a former major label recording artist, 
raised over $75,000 through online contributions on her website to fi-
nance a new album in fifty-three days, surpassing her initial goal.
40 
Sobule handed responsibility for the basic pitch to her mother, display-
ing this message on the website created for the fundraising drive: 
Hi, I’m Elaine, Jill’s mother. As you all know, my daughter is a 
real talent. She has put out 6 great CDs (which never leave my 
                                                                                                                      
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id.  
 34.  Antony  Bruno,  New Web Site Encourages Fan Remixes and Interaction, Reuters 
(Dec. 9, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/musicNews/idUSN0933738520071209.  
 35.  Id. 
 36.  See  CASH Music, http://www.cashmusic.org/more (last visited Sept. 21, 2010) 
(“CASH Music is a . . . nonprofit organization building open-source tools and services to 
benefit artists and music organizations. It’s our belief that the need for technology should 
never get in the way of promotion, distribution, or support of great music.”).  
 37.  See, e.g.,  Series 1,  CASH Music, http://kristinhersh.cashmusic.org/series1/ (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2010). 
 38.  E.g., id. (click on an individual track on the right to see a download link for the mix 
stems).  
 39.  Id.  
 40.  See Questions & Answers, Jill’s Next Record, http://www.jillsnextrecord.com/ 
faq.asp (last visited Sept. 21, 2010) (“Think of it as a kind of a web-based telethon, or the 
pledge drive for your favorite public TV or radio station. We’re taking donations here (using 
PayPal for online payment processing) and, just like with a telethon, you can watch the tote 
board and see how we’re doing.”).  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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stereo), and has been on 4 labels—two of which went bankrupt; 
the other two were also farkakte. 
This time she wants to do it on her own. She has some wonder-
ful new songs (although she has not sent them to me, like I 
asked). She also has lined up some wonderful musicians and 
guest artists. 
So help and be a part of her new album, in exchange for some 
wonderful gifts and services.
41 
Five hundred fifty-six people contributed to the fundraising drive, 
with most paying between $10 and $100 (one fan paid $10,000) before 
Sobule closed the site to donations.
42 At each level of contribution, 
Sobule offered informal rewards connected to the production of the al-
bum (for example, free digital downloads before the official release, free 
admission to Sobule’s shows in 2008).
43 One critic referred to the album 
(entitled California Years) as one of the first releases to be funded en-
tirely by “fan anticipation.”
44 
All of the models discussed above emerged in the last three years 
alone. But despite broad experimentation, there is still no consensus on 
cooperative models’ potential as a mode of artist compensation. Indeed, 
the criteria for deeming a cooperative model “successful” remain elu-
sive. The cooperative experiments we describe here, generally speaking, 
have exhibited high levels of free riding.
 Is that a signal that permissive 
downloading norms are so firmly rooted that voluntary compensation 
models will inevitably fall short, or is the overall percentage of people 
who download for free a misleading statistic? Discussion of cooperative 
models tends to assume that voluntary payment must replace the tradi-
tional industry model in order to be deemed significant. The traditional 
model, however (as we discuss in greater detail below), is not a particu-
larly efficient mechanism for delivering revenue to artists. 
Finally, the basic mechanics of cooperative models have received too 
little attention; that is, we don’t know much about how they work. The 
                                                                                                                      
 41.  A Message from Jill, Jill’s Next Record, http://www.jillsnextrecord.com/Prev-
msg.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2010). 
  42.  Sobule cut off contributions after exceeding her goal of $75,000—the amount she 
estimated would be necessary to produce the new record. See Tote Board, Jill’s Next Re-
cord, http://www.jillsnextrecord.com/toteboard.asp (last visited Sept. 11, 2010). Sobule treats 
fan donations as contributions, not as investments with an associated right to return on capital. 
Questions & Answers, supra note 40.  
  43.  The website that Sobule created for the fundraising drive displayed an ongoing tally 
of contributions, broken down by amount contributed and also by state and country. See Tote 
Board, supra note 42. 
 44.  Ben  Greenman,  Price Point, The New Yorker, Apr. 13, 2009, at 14.  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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models discussed above, and the models that we examine in depth in this 
Article, rely on different design strategies. No attempt has yet been made 
to identify best practices and examples of systemic failure in the devel-
opment of voluntary payment models. As a result, we have only a crude 
picture of why such models succeed and why they fail. 
II. Music Industry Baselines 
The landscape is changing quickly, but at least this much is clear: 
revenues from retail sales of recorded works represent a small percent-
age of overall income for most musicians.
45 As a result, relatively 
small-scale cooperative models can—from the perspective of individ-
ual musicians—amount to a major improvement over existing options. 
In order to see why this is so, one must understand how standard re-
cord label-artist recording contracts work. As of 2005, four major record 
labels controlled almost 72% of the market for recorded works.
46 In a 
standard major label contract, an artist ordinarily receives a royalty be-
tween 9–12% on every (physical) album sold.
47 The Future of Music 
Coalition, a non-profit organization devoted to bettering economic con-
ditions for musicians, estimates that the actual royalty is usually more 
like 6%, as labels generally take “standard industry deductions” (for ex-
ample, warehousing fees, deduction for promotional free copies) that 
reduce the artist’s share of each album sold.
48 Factoring in such deduc-
tions, the authors of This Business of Music, a popular industry guide 
now in its tenth edition, estimate that an artist receiving a 12% base roy-
                                                                                                                      
 45.  See John Seabrook, The Price of the Ticket, The New Yorker, Aug. 10, 2009, at 
34. 
 46.  See IFPI Releases Definitive Statistics on Global Market for Recorded Music, IFPI 
(Aug. 2, 2005), http://www.ifpi.org/content/section_news/20050802.html. A slew of “inde-
pendent” labels control the remainder of the market. Id. See generally Int’l Fed’n of the 
Phonographic Indus., Digital Music Report 2009, [hereinafter Digital Music Report] 
available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/dmr2009.pdf (describing the market structure 
of the recording industry).  
  47.  The royalty figure is complicated by the existence of two distinct intellectual prop-
erty rights residing in the recorded work—the copyright in the sound recording, and the 
copyright in the underlying piece of music. Terry Fisher estimates that composer and per-
former royalties amount to 4% and 12%, respectively, of an album’s retail price. Thus, when a 
recording artist is also a work’s composer, the expected royalty percentage will be higher. See 
William W. Fisher III, Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future of En-
tertainment 262 (2004).  
 48.  Major Label Contract Clause Critique,  Future of Music Coalition (Oct. 3, 
2001), http://futureofmusic.org/article/article/major-label-contract-clause-critique.  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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alty ultimately receives approximately $0.55 for every $15.00 album 
sold (12% of $15.00 is $1.80).
49 
Before an artist begins receiving royalties, album sales must surpass 
a “break even” point defined by the up-front investment that the label 
puts into the album’s production, distribution, and promotion.
50 These 
costs vary dramatically. A self-produced artist working with her own 
equipment can produce an album for as little as a few thousand dollars.
51 
In a typical major label release, recording costs alone typically run from 
$80,000–150,000.
52 
Of the approximately 32,000 albums released in the United States 
each year, less than 10% sell enough to allow the label to recoup its up-
front costs.
53 Fewer than 250 of those 32,000 albums sell more than 
10,000 copies, and fewer than 30 go platinum (i.e., sell more than 1 mil-
lion copies).
54 Thus, the overwhelming majority of album releases net no 
revenue for the individual artist, and it is common for artists to wind up 
owing money to the record label for un-recouped recording and promo-
tion costs.
55 
The market for recorded music is increasingly going digital amidst a 
steady decline in physical CD sales, but unfavorable contract terms for 
artists persist. In 2008, record companies brought in $3.7 billion globally 
from digital music sales, 20% of the overall market for recorded music 
(up from 5% of global revenue in 2005, and 15% in 2007).
56 The major-
ity of digital revenues came from individual song downloads through 
platforms such as Apple’s iTunes online music store.
57 Artists, however, 
typically receive only a royalty between 8–14% on each download, with 
iTunes retaining a 35% cut and the remainder going to the record label.
58 
                                                                                                                      
 49.  M. William Krasilovsky & Sidney Shemel, This Business of Music 21 (10th 
ed. 2007).  
 50.  Id. at 22–23.  
 51.  See David Kusek & Gerd Leonhard, The Future of Music: Manifesto for 
the Digital Music Revolution 143 (2005).  
 52.  Krasilovsky & Shemel, supra note 49, at 22.  
 53.  Kusek & Leonhard, supra note 51, at 108.  
 54.  Id.  
  55.  Record labels generally treat an up-front advance as a non-recourse loan to the 
artist, and recoup their costs out of the artist’s share of future royalties. Because the loan is 
treated as non-recourse, the advance functions as the only tangible income most recording 
artists receive—and the amount of any advance varies according to a recording artist’s relative 
bargaining power. See Moses Avalon, Secrets of Negotiating a Recording Contract 
11–12 (2001). As fewer than 10% of artists sell enough records to cover the advance, most 
artists never see any royalties, and indeed, at least in theory, owe money to the label. See 
Kusek & Leonhard, supra note 51, at 108.  
 56.  See Digital Music Report, supra note 46, at 6–7.  
 57.  See id. at 6, 10.  
 58.  See  iTunes iSbogus,  Downhill Battle, http://www.downhillbattle.org/itunes/ 
(last visited Sept. 12, 2010).  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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Further, the persistence of illicit peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file-sharing pre-
sents a serious challenge for artists who seek to convert downloads into 
revenue. A major music industry trade group estimates that for every 
legal song downloaded (through online stores like iTunes), nearly twenty 
copies are downloaded over the file-sharing networks.
59 
For artists seeking a route around record labels and the accompany-
ing unfavorable contract terms, alternative pathways have emerged. 
From the standpoint of artist compensation, the online music store CD 
Baby is perhaps the most successful new model.
60 CD Baby distributes 
the work of independent artists (i.e., those that are not affiliated with a 
record label), and serves as both a download platform and a distributor 
of physical CDs.
61 In contrast to the traditional model, CD Baby strives 
to minimize overhead costs: approximately 90% of revenues generated 
through the site is paid directly to the artists.
62 
Since its founding ten years ago, more than 228,000 artists have dis-
tributed their music through CD Baby, and over 4.2 million albums have 
been sold through the site, generating over $97 million in revenue dis-
tributed directly to artists.
63 In 2008, the site’s most successful sales year 
to date (based on available information), CD Baby paid out more than 
$34 million in revenue to artists.
64 
While the aggregate sales numbers are impressive—especially con-
sidering the industry-wide decline in CD sales—the average artist selling 
music through CD Baby received a payment of just $228 in 2008.
65 Four 
thousand artists received between $1000 and $10,000 in payments from 
CD Baby, and roughly 200 (out of more than 150,000 artists selling mu-
sic on the site) earned more than $10,000.
66 
Of course, record sales amount to just one potential revenue stream 
for musicians—others include payment for live performances, merchan-
dise sales, and work-for-hire composing gigs. Despite the myriad ways 
that musicians manage to make a living, and the ubiquity of music in 
most of our lives, their aggregate income tends to be quite modest. In 
                                                                                                                      
 59.  See Digital Music Report, supra note 46, at 22 (“IFPI, collating separate studies 
in 16 countries over a four-year period, estimated unauthorised file-sharing at over 40 billion 
files in 2008. This means that globally around 95 per cent of music tracks are downloaded 
without payment to the artist or the music company that produced them.”).  
 60.  See  generally  CD Baby, http://www.cdbaby.com/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2010) 
(website for world’s largest online distributor of independent (i.e., not distributed by an estab-
lished record label) music).  
 61.  About Us, CD Baby, http://www.cdbaby.com/About (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 
 62.  Tony  van  Veen,  CD Baby 2008 Stats for CD and Download Sales, CD Baby Blog 
(Jan. 15, 2009, 8:49 AM), http://cdbaby.org/stories/09/01/15/8158752.html.  
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
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2005, the 273,000 working musicians in the United States earned an av-
erage annual income of around $30,000.
67 Taking into account the low 
percentage of recorded works that sell enough copies to justify their up-
front costs, it is clear that existing models do not permit the vast majority 
of musicians to depend on the sale of recorded works to satisfy their ba-
sic material needs. 
In sum, existing pathways for the sale and distribution of music 
make it very difficult for musicians to profit from their recorded works. 
The persistence of illicit file-sharing and the rise of legal download plat-
forms that hold a large share of overall revenue combine to squeeze 
digital sales as a mode of artist compensation. While online distribution 
carries the promise of empowering musicians and providing them with a 
more reliable stream of income, that potential remains for the most part 
untapped. 
III. Results from the Three Study Sites 
The three study sites at the center of this paper employ cooperative 
models similar, at a general level, to the distribution experiments sum-
marized above. On closer inspection, however, their different approaches 
to fostering cooperation are significant and instructive. Our research 
team followed each of the study sites for over a year, retaining complete 
access to sales databases and web activity data. 
Let us first clarify the ways in which the study sites rely on social 
cooperation. First, the artists that distribute their music through the study 
sites are sufficiently popular that their music could be found either 
through P2P networks or by identifying and trading with users who have 
already purchased songs. Because much of the music is licensed under 
Creative Commons licenses, doing so would be perfectly legal. Thus, to 
the extent that users are coming to the three study sites and paying to 
download music, they are choosing to pay and taking the time to do so, 
even though there are alternative avenues through which they could le-
gally acquire the music for free.
68 
Next, each of the sites involve some form of voluntary or flexible 
payment—specifically, payment that users need not make if their only 
goal is to access music for the lowest possible price. Users who do con-
tribute “extra” money are thus voluntarily contributing to the artists’ 
                                                                                                                      
 67.  Kusek & Leonhard, supra note 51, at 108.  
  68.  At least in the case of Coulton, who also makes his music available on iTunes, fans 
who come to pay on the site may benefit the artist by cutting out iTunes. However, doing so 
imposes higher transactions costs on the downloader—iTunes is popular, convenient, and easy 
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well-being, and are demonstrating generosity in the dyadic relationship 
of fan to artist. They are also supporting the continued creation of mu-
sic—a public good. 
Finally, Jonathan Coulton’s music distribution model relies on coop-
eration in that he specifically enlists fans to help with promotion, concert 
planning, and creation of new mashups, without compensating them. 
Users who respond to these solicitations are cooperating with Coulton by 
contributing time and effort. 
With the exception of Coulton, the artists associated with the study 
sites generally make modest amounts from download sales. The amounts 
are, nonetheless, substantial by comparison to what artists can expect to 
make from royalties under the traditional approach (and newer alterna-
tive approaches). On Magnatune, top-selling artists can earn from 
$8000–10,000 per year.
69 Jane Siberry’s online store yielded more than 
$33,000 over the three years between the site’s launch in March 2005 
and the conclusion of our study. Considering that the vast majority of 
artists net little or no income from the sale of their recorded works,
70 
these numbers reflect substantial fan contributions. Jonathan Coulton 
earns about $90,000 per year from digital downloads on his personal 
site. To achieve a similar level of compensation through more traditional 
channels, Coulton would need to sell about 650,000 full albums per year 
through iTunes, and much more under the more artist-unfriendly terms 
contained within a standard record industry contract. 
A. Jane Siberry’s Online Music Store 
Canadian singer-songwriter Jane Siberry
71 launched an experiment in 
consumer-determined pricing in March 2005.
72 She made digital 
                                                                                                                      
  69.  Data on the study sites are on file with the authors. Magnatune’s contracts 
with artists are non-exclusive. Distribution Contract Terms,  Magnatune, http:// 
www.magnatune.com/info/terms (last visited Oct. 9, 2010). Magnatune revenues are often 
only a portion of a given artist’s revenues from recorded works. What We Do for Our Musi-
cians, Magnatune, http://www.magnatune.com/info/whatwedo (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).  
 70.  See discussion supra Part II. 
  71.  Jane Siberry released several albums on major record labels through the 1980s and 
early 1990s, and enjoyed considerable commercial and critical success. See  Jane Siberry 
Biography,  ARTISTdirect, http://www.artistdirect.com/artist/bio/jane-siberry/492899 (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2010). She is perhaps best known for her song “Calling All Angels,” released 
as a duet with k.d. lang on her 1993 album When I Was a Boy. Id. In 1995, Siberry created her 
own independent label, SHEEBA Records, and has since released all of her new material on 
that imprint. Id.; see also Jane Siberry Opens a Window on a Better Download World, Elec-
tronic Frontier Found. (Nov. 27, 2005), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2005/11/jane-
siberry-opens-window-better-download-world [hereinafter Jane Siberry Opens a Window] 
(reporting on Siberry’s then newly unveiled download store, where all of her songs were 
available as plain MP3s).  
 72.  See Jane Siberry Opens a Window, supra note 71. BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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download versions of recorded music from over fifteen albums available 
for free through a self-designed, owned, and operated online store.
73 
Siberry’s store permits fans to set their own price for music, or to pay 
nothing at all.
74 The downloads are not encumbered with restrictive code, 
and come in a high-fidelity MP3 format.
75 Siberry also makes sheet 
music, videos, and album artwork available, all on a voluntary payment 
model.
76 
After electing to download an individual song on Siberry’s site, a 
consumer selects from four options in a drop-down menu: (1) ”a gift 
from the artist” (no payment); (2)  ”standard price” ($0.99); (3)  ”self-
determined, pay now”; and (4) ”self-determined, pay later.”
77 Those who 
choose the “standard price” are directed to provide credit card informa-
tion, and those who choose the “self-determined” options are allowed to 
enter whatever price they like before providing payment.
78 The site in-
forms downloaders that choosing a price of less than $0.45 actually costs 
the site money, as it does not cover the transactional fee (it also informs 
visitors that free downloads bypass all transaction costs).
79 Siberry also 
makes entire albums available for sale, and the “standard price” varies 
depending on the number of tracks on the album (i.e., a four-song EP is 
priced at $3.33, and a full-length album at $9.99).
80 Potential customers 
can also elect to stream all of the music on the site before downloading, 
enabling them to preview a song before selecting a purchase option.
81 
The site presents visitors with a mission statement explaining the de-
sign principles, spirit, and reasoning behind Siberry’s pricing policy. It 
reads:  
This store model is based on the belief that: People are good. In 
trust, our best comes forward full force. To treat others as we 
would like to be treated is generous, not selfish. Good living can 
                                                                                                                      
 73.  Id. Siberry recently overhauled her website, altering or removing some of the fea-
tures discussed herein. For her current website, see Music,  Jane Siberry, http:// 
www.janesiberry.com/janesiberry/music.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2010). Sources for the 
website’s prior features are on file with the authors. Some of these features and language from 
the original website are available at Frequently Asked Questions, Sheeba Music Catalogue, 
http://www.jemmoore.com/store/help.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). Citations to this web-
site are provided where consistent with Siberry’s original website.  
 74.  Jane Siberry Opens a Window, supra note 71. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  See Music, supra note 73. 
 77.  Jane Siberry Opens a Window, supra note 71. Siberry removed the “pay later” 
option in March 2008. See Music, supra note 73. 
 78.  See Jane Siberry Opens a Window, supra note 71. 
 79.  Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 73.  
  80.  Data on file with authors. 
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still come from not trying to control things; in trusting in a wider 
sense of transactions. We are ‘a part’ more than ‘apart’. 
Things to ponder. Not too long, though. Life is out there waiting. 
The most important thing is that the music flow out to where it 
could bring enjoyment. And THAT is the best thing you could 
give back to me.
82 
The site also hosts an open-thread “feedback” page where fans can 
express their views on the pricing policy and explain the reasons for their 
payment decisions.
83 In March 2008, Siberry added a page entitled “crea-
tive currencies,” on which downloaders can commit to performing 
positive deeds in exchange for music downloads (“creative currency” is 
also now one of the options a downloader can choose from in electing 
their preferred mode of payment).
84 
Siberry displays summary statistics on the online store’s home page, 
reporting the percentage of downloaders that pay for an individual song, 
and the average price per song.
85 The summary statistics are incomplete. 
They do not include, for example, information about album sales, and 
the averages are not weighted to include those that download for free. 
Even so, the summary statistics provide visitors to the site with a basic 
sense of how others are behaving. 
We have analyzed sales data from Siberry’s site spanning from its 
launch in March 2005 through January 2009. Over that time, 52,661 
people downloaded content from the store, earning Siberry approxi-
mately $33,000 in revenue. Twenty-two percent of the transactions 
conducted on the site involved a voluntary payment. In the remaining 
transactions, the downloader selected the “gift from the artist” option, or 
chose the “pay later” option and never returned to make a contribution.  
 
Period of Record      
March 2005 through January 2009       
      
Total Revenue      
Total Songs  Albums   
$33,212 $22,387  $10,825   
      
 
                                                                                                                      
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  See Id. (listing statistics for February 3, 2005 through January 23, 2008). BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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Transactions      
  Total Songs  Albums 
Total 52,661  39,091  10,607 
Paid 11,638  8,660  2,175 
Unpaid 41,023  30,431  8,432 
Figure 1 
Download Transactions Per Month
86 
 
Shaded bars denote the month of December. The black line shows mean monthly reve-
nue, and the shaded region (dotted line) encompasses the 25th (5th) and 75th (95th) 
percentiles. 
 
The average price per song, among those who paid, was $1.25, and 
the average price per album was $9.00. The term “corrected average” 
refers to the average price among those who paid some amount for an 
album or song. The “nulls” represent transactions where, due to record-
keeping idiosyncrasies, Siberry’s sales database does not note whether a 
given downloader chose the standard price, self-determined price, or 
some other option, but does record the amount paid (if any). 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
  86.  Siberry began keeping track of web statistics in late 2006, and we are unable to 
represent web visitation data for the entire period of record.  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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Album Sales   
Average Prices  $1.85 
Corrected Average  $9.00 
Standard $9.06 
Self Determined  $8.30 
Nulls $1.61 
Nulls Corrected  $9.62 
Song Sales   
Average Price  $0.28 
Corrected Average  $1.25 
Standard $0.99 
Self Determined  $2.10 
Nulls $0.20 
Nulls Corrected  $1.29 
 
Three notable trends emerge upon close review of the sales data. 
First, voluntary contribution on Siberry’s site is persistent and relatively 
stable over a significant period of time. The declining number of transac-
tions reflects the natural drop-off in interest as the period since the 
release of the last new album increases. We see transactions picking up 
again in early 2009, when Siberry released a new album. Second, norm-
driven behavior appears to account for the bulk of voluntary contribu-
tions. Third, Siberry derives a great deal of her revenue from the 
downloaders who exhibit an unusual level of generosity—what we deem 
“asymmetric” contributors.  
Although a sizeable majority of downloaders elect to pay nothing, 
the combination of norm-driven behavior and unusual altruism led to an 
average price per song download that is higher than the average price in 
the standard forced payment (i.e., iTunes or Amazon.com) model. If we 
do not include those who download for free in the calculation of the av-
erage, contributors pay about 25% more than in the $0.99 per song 
forced payment models. 
If one compares the average including the nonpaying fans, however, 
then the relevant comparison to the forced payment system should in-
clude the nonpaying illegal downloaders. A major music industry trade 
group, in its 2009 annual report on the state of the global music market, 
found that for every legal digital MP3 sale, twenty digital files are 
downloaded illegally over the file-sharing networks.
87 On Siberry’s site, 
                                                                                                                      
 87.  See Digital Music Report, supra note 46, at 22.  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
Fall 2010]  Everything in Its Right Place  21 
 
the ratio is much more favorable to the artist (five free downloads for 
every paid download).
88 If the music industry’s estimation of illegal file-
sharing volume is correct, then the average payment per track in that sys-
tem is about $0.05, as compared to Siberry’s $0.28 (uncorrected). 
The figures below illustrate the point.
89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Stable Cooperative System 
All content on Siberry’s site is entirely free. One need not enter a 
credit card number or provide contact information to access digital 
                                                                                                                      
  88.  Although it is of course possible that some people download Siberry’s music over 
P2P file-sharing networks, we assume the volume of such downloads to be negligible given 
that downloaders can access free copies of Siberry’s work through her website without incur-
ring  any legal risk. Choosing to download Siberry’s work over P2P networks therefore 
amounts to a voluntarily choice to absorb an additional cost (i.e., the risk of incurring copy-
right liability, or receiving a corrupt or low quality file). Obtaining free downloads from 
Siberry’s website does not require the downloader to enter an email address or any other per-
sonal information. 
  89.  The “overhead” figure in the Voluntary Payment figure is a rough estimate of web 
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downloads. Over the course of three and a half years, approximately 
22% of the people that came to the site to download music chose to pay 
for it, and on average, they paid more than the standard iTunes baseline-
market price. Although the size of the average payment fluctuated 
somewhat, responding to internal events (for example, the launch of the 
site, Siberry’s release of a new album) and external events (media cover-
age of Siberry’s site connected with the Radiohead In Rainbows release), 
the percentage of people choosing to voluntarily pay for music stabilized 
around 22% and persisted at that level over the length of the study pe-
riod. 
The standard rational actor model, of course, predicts that anyone 
who wants to download Siberry’s music will choose the “gift” option. 
Doing so incurs no material costs, there is no threat of a lawsuit, and 
paying for music does not allow a downloader to obtain a higher quality 
file or any additional material benefit. In a slightly more expansive view 
of rational self-interest, contribution would have to be explained with a 
“warm glow” or a self-signaling model, since the transactions are opaque 
to others and so cannot provide a social-signaling or reputation func-
tion.
90 
Figure 2 
Dollars Per MP3 Download
91 
 
Average Individual MP3 Price (excluding free downloads) 
                                                                                                                      
 90.  See Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 1652, 1657–58 (2006).  
  91.  Over the first few months of 2005, Siberry did not record how many people 
downloaded for free, which accounts for the inflated average at the beginning of the graph. 
The following two figures show average song and album price, excluding free downloads.  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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Figure 3 
 
Figure 4 
 
 
Average Album Price (excluding free downloads)
92 
                                                                                                                      
  92.  The shaded bars in Figure 4 denote prices in November of each year. BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
24  Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review  [Vol.17:1 
 
2. Norm-Driven Cooperators, Focal Points, 
and Asymmetric Contribution 
A relatively small group of moderate contributors are responsible for 
about 70% of Siberry’s overall revenue, and a tiny group of hyper-
generous altruists account for a non-trivial portion.
93 The tables below 
reflect the percentage of revenue, and the overall frequency of “normal” 
and hyper-generous payments, for both individual song (MP3) and full 
album downloads (.zip). 
MP3 Downloads 
Bin  Frequency 
Frequency 
%  Revenue % 
$0.00 30229  77.74% 0% 
$0.50 542 1.39% 2% 
$1.00 6991  17.98%  61% 
$2.00 744 1.91% 8% 
$3.00 164 0.42% 8% 
$5.00 129 0.33% 7% 
$10.00 64 0.16% 5% 
$>10.00 23  0.06%  8% 
 
Album Downloads 
Bin  Frequency 
Frequency 
%  Revenue % 
$0.00 8432  79%  0% 
$2.00 175  2%  1% 
$6.00 469  4%  11% 
$10.00 608  6%  30% 
$12.00 789  7%  45% 
$18.00 86  1%  6% 
$30.00 39  0.4% 4% 
$100.00 9  0.1% 2% 
 
 
Close to 7,000 contributors paid the “industry standard” payment of 
about $1, and another 700 paid twice that amount, together accounting 
for 69% of the revenue from singles. Three hundred eighty downloaders 
paid $3 or more for an individual MP3 (just under 1% of all MP3 
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downloaders), but these hyper-generous contributors accounted for 28% 
of the total revenue from MP3 sales. Similarly, about 1400 downloaders 
contributed around the less well-defined “industry standard” (as we will 
see from Magnatune, this number is typical) of $10 or $12 per album, 
accounting for 75% of the revenue from albums. One hundred thirty-four 
downloaders paid $18 or more for a full album (1.5% of all album 
downloaders), accounting for 12% of the total revenue from album sales. 
This pattern of contribution is consistent with at least three or four 
distinct motivational profiles. First, around 78% (+/-1%) of downloaders 
pay nothing. Given the persistent and pervasive nature of this public 
good problem, it is impossible, to separate the self-interested actors from 
the conditional cooperators in this group.
94 It is well understood theoreti-
cally, and well-established experimentally, that in a repeated public 
goods game, where cooperators have no means of policing defectors or 
reciprocating their defection, conditional cooperators “reciprocate” or 
“punish” the defectors by withholding their own contributions.
95 The 
surprising result is that, despite the absence of any means of punishment 
or reputation, a stable portion continues to contribute. Based on the 
amount contributed, this portion seems to fall into two categories. The 
bulk of the remaining participants contribute a “normal” amount, where 
“normal” is defined either from the internal promptings of the site itself 
(as we will see in the study of Magnatune), or derived from baseline cul-
tural understandings of whatever behavior counts as appropriate for that 
setting. “Normal” can reflect moral commitment,
96 whether enforced 
emotionally, cognitively, or some combination of the two;
97 social con-
formism;
98 or a norm-defined level of “fair” or “equitable” payment, 
which in turn is enforced by the kind of inequity aversion that has been 
                                                                                                                      
  94.  The prevailing experimental finding is that in unmodified public goods games, a 
substantial number of players initially cooperate, but gradually reduce cooperation over the 
life of the experiment once they see that other players are free riding. See Ernst Fehr & Simon 
Gӓchter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 Nature 137, 137–39 (2002). In the field 
setting we studied, an observation of a high level of non-contribution almost certainly corre-
sponds to later stages of the experimental model, where both self-interested players and 
conditional cooperators no longer contribute to the common pool. 
 95.  See id.  
 96.  See Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of 
Economic Theory, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 317 (1977).  
  97.  The long debate over the source of moral commitments, whether based in moral 
emotions or sentiments, as Hume and Smith posited, or in rational commitment, as Kant 
would have it, continues in cognitive psychology today. See Marc Hauser, Moral Minds 
20–26, 31, 36 (2006); Joshua D. Green, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, in 3 Moral Psy-
chology 35, 41 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2006).  
 98.  See Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Culture and the Evolutionary 
Process 205–212 (1985); Joe Henrich & Robert Boyd, The Evolution of Conformist Trans-
mission and the Emergence of Between-Group Differences, 19 Evolution & Hum. Behav. 
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shown to exist experimentally in many studies.
99 It is difficult to tell 
which of these mechanisms is at play here, because Siberry uses both 
appeals to “the market price,” which would evoke the focal point of 
$0.99 from iTunes and Amazon.com, and also speaks of fairness, trust, 
and generosity, thus evoking several mechanisms. 
What is interesting about these actors is that they seem to be distinct 
from the conditional cooperators, who are predicted and observed to re-
ciprocate the behavior of large numbers of noncontributors by 
withholding their own contributions. Rather, this appears to be an in-
stance of norm-driven behavior that successfully overcomes, for some 
actors, the inter-contributor negative reciprocity usually thought to lead 
to the unraveling of cooperation in public goods games without punish-
ment. Finally, there is the group of hyper-generous altruists who pay 
well above anything that could be considered norm-compliant. These 
findings support the ideas that: (a) there are different “types” of agents, 
who respond differently to different types of motivations; and (b) not all 
forms of prosociality are the same, and not all are triggered by the same 
mechanisms or susceptible to the same failures. Even in a repeated pub-
lic goods game, as here, there remains a substantial minority of 
contributors consisting of what appear to be norm-driven contributors 
and altruists. 
For purposes of design, these findings suggest that a site needs both 
normative triggers and affordances for asymmetric contribution, in order 
to capture contributions from this diverse range of motivational types. 
B. Magnatune—Internet Label with Flexible Pricing Scheme 
In May 2003, after watching his wife and friends endure the tribula-
tions of releasing their CDs through a classic record label, John 
Buckman founded Magnatune.
100 Unlike Siberry’s site, which houses a 
few artists, Buckman envisioned Magnatune as a music label that would 
embrace “Internet Reality.”
101 It would allow file-sharing,
102 share profits 
fairly,
103 and reject the strict $0.99 per song industry default price. In-
stead, Magnatune uses a flexible payment scale for online music sales in 
                                                                                                                      
  99.  See Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evi-
dence and Economic Applications, in 1 Advances in Economics and Econometrics 208, 
211–218 (Mathias Dewatripont et al. eds., 2003).  
 100.  John Buckman, Founder’s Rant,  Magnatune, http://www.magnatune.com/info/ 
why (last visited Oct. 8, 2010); see also Interview with John Buckman, Red Hat Mag. (Apr. 
2005), http://www.redhat.com/magazine/006apr05/features/buckman/. 
 101.  Buckman,  Founder’s Rant, supra note 100. 
 102.  Give 3 Free Copies to Your Friends,  Magnatune, http://www.magnatune.com/ 
info/give (last visited Oct. 8, 2010). 
 103.  See  Why We Are Not Evil,  Magnatune, http://www.magnatune.com/info/ 
whynotevil (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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which the price paid for music is set by the buyer.
104 Commenting on the 
sliding scale, a USA Today reporter said, “The Internet makes dynamic 
pricing possible—prices that change depending on demand. EBay’s auc-
tions are one way to do it. Magnatune is trying something a little 
different—and it includes playing on a buyer’s conscience.”
105 
The model relies on two basic assumptions: first, customers will pay 
more than the required minimum when they feel they are being treated 
fairly by a record label and know that a label’s artists are treated fairly as 
well; and second, customers will pay more when they are permitted to 
stream full versions of albums before deciding whether to purchase 
them.  
Magnatune currently maintains a catalogue of over 700 albums
106 in 
a diverse range of genres (including classical),
107 and offers the artists’ 
works as digital album downloads and as part of a commercial licensing 
package.
108 All revenues are split evenly with the artists.
109 The label 
maintains a strict selection process, accepting submissions from only 
three percent of artists, and only those who fit the label’s creative pro-
file.
110 
Magnatune’s sliding scale model offers multiple ways for visitors to 
consume albums for free. Site visitors can stream the label’s entire cata-
logue without making a purchase or click “license” and download 
albums under a Creative Commons license.
111 The choice to make the 
downloads accessible only after a user clicks “license,” rather than pre-
senting the “free” or “gift” options like Siberry or Coulton, is a pointed 
one. As Buckman explains: 
The reason for this seemingly arcane process is to divide users 
between those looking for ‘free as in beer’ from those looking 
for ‘free as in freedom’. The ‘free as in beer’ people would be 
unlikely to think to click on the ‘license’ button, looking instead 
for a download button. The ‘free as in freedom’ people (i.e., 
                                                                                                                      
 104.  Magnatune has recently shifted to a membership model. See  Magnatune Re-
launches as Membership Site,  Magnatune, http://www.magnatune.com/info/news/email/ 
albums-2010-03-25.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). The following discussion describes the 
prior “sliding scale” model. 
 105.  Kevin Maney, Apple iTunes Might Not Be Only Answer to Ending Piracy, USA 
Today, Jan. 4, 2004, at 3B.  
 106.  Magnatune Statistics,  Magnatune, http://www.magnatune.com/info/stats/ (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2010).  
 107.  MP3  Music  Genres, Magnatune, http://www.magnatune.com/genres/ (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2010).  
 108.  Music Licensing at Magnatune,  Magnatune, http://www.magnatune.com/info/ 
licensing (last visited Oct. 8, 2010). 
 109.  Why We Are Not Evil, supra note 103. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Interview with John Buckman, supra note 100. BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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creators who want to make a new work) are more likely to want 
to see what the license cost and terms are. The goal of this ap-
proach is to offer the CC licensed downloads for free to creative 
people, while the consuming public pays for downloads.”
112 
In addition to the voluntary payment system and the framing of the 
free download option, Magnatune is also unique in that users control 
how much they pay for albums and subscriptions.
113 The label charges 
between $5 and $18 per album, and recommends that purchasers pay $8. 
Purchasers choose a price from a drop-down menu that says “How much 
do you want to pay? $8 (typical), $10 (better than average), $12 (gener-
ous), $15 (VERY generous), $18 (We love you!).”
114 These prompts 
create normative focal points for differently motivated users—ranging 
from those who want to pay the minimum, to those who want to conform 
to a behavioral norm, to those who want to signal that they are better 
than average or even hyper-generous. 
The transaction can be completed by credit card or PayPal, and pur-
chasers are free to leave their email addresses so that they can be 
contacted by artists.
115 In addition, until recently, physical CDs could also 
be purchased for an additional $4.97, covering the costs of materials and 
shipping.
116 
Magnatune added a subscription component in May 2008, and tink-
ered with the component’s design during the study period.
117 Initially, 
purchasers were allowed to buy streaming or download memberships at 
                                                                                                                      
 112.
  E-mail from John Buckman, Founder and Owner, Magnatune, to authors (Feb. 4, 
2010, 2:09 PM EST) (on file with authors).  
 113.  Interview with John Buckman, supra note 100. To understand the business models 
of open sharing of music, it is worth noting that Magnatune also offers efficient commercial 
licensing features. In addition to downloading and purchasing albums for individual use, con-
sumers can commercially license music for use in films, ringtones, podcasts, and other media. 
Commercial licensing represents the site’s largest source of revenue and continues to grow. 
Unlike the industry standard where licensees often have to show music owners the final work 
or pay copyright owners perpetual royalties, Magnatune uses a fast, computerized process. 
Licensees provide details on how the music will be used and the predicted scope of distribu-
tion, and Magnatune, trusting the honesty of users, charges a flat fee. These attributes of the 
site, while interesting, do not go to the question of voluntary donation that is the core concern 
of our study. See The Business Model, Magnatune, http://www.magnatune.com/info/model 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2010).  
 114.  See infra Figure 8. 
 115.  FAQ: Download Membership,  Magnatune, http://www.magnatune.com/info/ 
faq_download (last visited Nov. 18, 2010); What’s In It for Musicians,  Magnatune, 
http://www.magnatune.com/info/musicians (last visited Oct. 8, 2010). 
 116.  See FAQ: Download Membership, supra note 115. 
 117.  See John Buckman, Magnatune Memberships: The Only “All You Can Eat” DRM-
Free Music Subscription Service, buckman’s magnatune blog (May 7, 2008, 11:09 AM), 
http://blogs.magnatune.com/buckman/2008/05/magnatune-membe.html.  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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three month, one year, or lifetime intervals (Period 1).
118 Four months 
later, Magnatune added a flexible payment model to the subscriptions 
option, allowing customers to select their own price for a subscription by 
filling in a box and replacing a default price with the new number (Pe-
riod 2).
119 Finally, in November of 2008, Buckman added a one month 
option to the subscription offerings, lowering the minimum commitment 
required (Period 3).
120 
We analyzed consumer sales data for Magnatune’s site spanning 
over five years from May 2003 to November 2008.
121 Over that time, 
75,186 transactions were completed, generating $671,770 in revenue. 
This sum does not include commercial licensing revenues. 
Figure 5 
  Period of Record  Total Transactions
Total 
Revenue 
Albums  5/13/2003–12/11/2008 73589 $600,750 
Subscriptions 4/30/2008–11/20/2008 1597 $71,020 
 
Table 1  
  Mean Median  Mode 
Total 8.16  8.00  8.00 
Period 1  8.06  8.00  8.00 
Period 2  8.32  800  8.00 
Period 3  8.24  8.00  8.00 
      
 
Average price per album during three time periods. The difference in 
mean prices between Period 1 and Periods 2 and 3 is significant at 
p > .05. There is no statistically significant difference between the mean 
album price during Periods 2 and 3. 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
 118.  Id. 
 119.  John  Buckman,  Pay-What You Want Memberships, buckman’s magnatune blog 
(Sept. 27, 2008, 4:13 AM), http://blogs.magnatune.com/buckman/2008/09/pay-what-you-
wa.html. 
 120.  John Buckman, Membership Without Obligation, buckman’s magnatune blog, 
(Nov. 18, 2008, 4:31 AM), http://blogs.magnatune.com/buckman/2008/11/membership-
with.html. 
  121.  Data on file with the authors. BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
30  Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review  [Vol.17:1 
 
The median price paid for albums was $8.00. The mean price paid 
for albums was $8.06 and increased to $8.32 after introduction of the 
subscription option. 
Figure 6 
 
Average weekly album price throughout the course of the record. The gray box spans the 
25th and 75th percentiles. 
 
Four major trends can be seen in the Magnatune sales database. 
First, the sales data indicates that Magnatune is a stable cooperative sys-
tem in which purchasers regularly pay more for albums than is required. 
Second, purchasers are influenced by words of encouragement that cre-
ate very clear focal points around which fans coordinate their 
purchasing. Third, like Siberry’s fans, fans on Magnatune show both 
significant norm-conformism and include a small number of hypergen-
erous altruists with a significant effect on total contributions. About 50% 
of the contributors aim to pay the “typical” amount, and another 12% 
“above average.” These categories of users account for about 60% of the 
site’s revenues. Another 7.5% of users pay hypergenerous amounts. The 
result is that Magnatune earns about 15% of its revenues from the 
roughly 9% of purchasers who seem to respond to generosity-signaling, 
as opposed to typicality or average-signaling, focal points. Unlike Si-
berry’s site, however, less than 10% of users choose to pay the 
minimum. This presumably reflects the fact that those who choose to 
pay nothing must do so by copying from friends, rather than having an 
explicit option to download for free, as with Siberry’s site. Finally, the 
subscription trends suggest that over time new subscribers congregate BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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around the least burdensome subscription option but continue to pay 
more than the minimum. 
1. Stable Cooperative System—Over 90% of Revenue Generated 
from People Paying More than the Minimum Required 
In the standard rational-actor model, one would expect fans of the 
music distributed on Magnatune to pay nothing. The music is available 
legally and at high technical quality, and can be redistributed at low cost 
once one copy has been downloaded. Even among fans who choose to 
buy the music, the standard prediction is that fans would pay the mini-
mum $5 per album required for purchase. Instead, the payment history 
over five years demonstrates that Magnatune fans are consistently coop-
erating and voluntarily paying significantly more than what the site 
requires. The average price paid on the site is $8, 60% more than the 
minimum required $5 payment. This average payment has persisted from 
the site’s launch through half a decade of music industry development. 
Significantly, the introduction of subscription payments on the site did 
not disrupt the trend of stable voluntary payment.  
Figure 7 
 
Weekly revenue. The gray box spans the 25th and 75th percentiles. 
 
The level of generosity exhibited by Magnatune’s customers is also 
significant. It is not just a small crowd of people that pay more than what 
is required—over 80% of purchasers do, and only 16% of albums are 
purchased at the minimum price of $5. The generosity of the voluntary 
contributors is also notable in that nearly 20% of purchasers paid $10 or BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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more—twice the minimum payment required. As a result, over 90% of 
Magnatune revenues flow from album purchases of $8 or more.  
Table 2 
 
  Bin Frequency %  Revenue  Revenue  % 
Minimum  $5.00 11720  15.93%  $58,600  9.72% 
  $5.50  446  0.61% $2,453 0.41% 
  $6.00 3411 4.64%  $20,466  3.4% 
  $6.50 28 0.04%  $182  0.03% 
  $7.00  2053  2.79% $14,371 2.38% 
  $7.50  2159  2.93% $16,193 2.69% 
Typical  $8.00 35362  48.05%  $282,896  46.93% 
  $8.50  250  0.34% $2,125 0.35% 
  $9.00  1426  1.94% $12,834 2.13% 
  $9.50  420  0.57% $3,990 0.66% 
Better than 
Average  $10.00  8974  12.19% $89,740 14.89% 
  $10.50  216  0.29% $2,268 0.38% 
  $11.00  395  0.54% $4,345 0.72% 
  $11.50 10 0.01%  $115  0.02% 
Generous  $12.00  3657  4.97% $43,884 7.28% 
  $12.50 67 0.09%  $838  0.14% 
  $13.00  193  0.26% $2,509 0.42% 
  $13.50 33 0.04%  $446  0.07% 
  $14.00  323  0.44% $4,522 0.75% 
  $14.50 68 0.09%  $986  0.16% 
Very Generous  $15.00  1072  1.46% $16,080 2.67% 
  $15.50 9 0.01%  $140  0.02% 
  $16.00  188  0.26% $3,008 0.50% 
  $16.50  91  0.12% $1,502 0.25% 
  $17.00 26 0.04%  $442  0.07% 
  $17.50  81  0.11% $1,418 0.24% 
We Love You  $18.00  867  1.18% $15,606 2.59% 
  $18.50 9 0.01%  $167  0.03% BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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  Bin Frequency %  Revenue  Revenue  % 
 $19.00  6  0.01%  $114  0.02% 
 $22.50  3  0.00%  $68  0.01% 
 $24.00  18  0.02%  $432  0.07% 
 
Total album sales binned by their relative frequency and percent of total revenue. 
2. Coordination Around Focal Points 
and Norm-Driven Behavior 
The Magnatune sales data also illustrates how descriptive signals at-
tached to specific prices can create clear focal points around which 
purchasers coordinate. Although purchasers can select any dollar amount 
between $5 and $18, 84% of purchasers select a dollar value that has a 
corresponding label of “typical,” “better than average,” “generous,” 
“very generous,” or “we love you.” Note that there is no written signal 
next to the minimum $5 payment.  
Figure 8 
 
 
The coordination around focal points is also illustrated by the steep 
drop in the percentage of purchasers making payments at rates that do 
not have corresponding signals. For example, in contrast to the 2% who 
paid $9 or the 1.4% who paid $11, 12% of purchasers paid $10 for their 
albums. This pattern indicates the strong effect of reference-dependent 
payments,
122 but unlike the standard economic models, the reference on 
                                                                                                                      
 122.  See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Ref-
erence-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. Econ. 1039, 1039–61 (1991); Botond Koszegi & Matthew 
Rabin, A Model Of Reference-Dependent Preferences, 121 Q.J. Econ. 1133, 1133–65 (2006). BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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which the preference is dependent is a normative one, not an alternative 
price, good, or state to which the agent orients herself.  
Words of encouragement communicated in descriptive signals 
around the pricing seem to have a significant impact in coordinating co-
operative behavior. Designating $8.00 as “typical” seems to have pulled 
48.05% of contributors to the $8.00 price, 2.93% to $7.50, and 0.34% to 
$8.50, as opposed to $7.00 or to the minimum. Part of the result can be 
explained by reference to the apparent allure of whole numbers, as we 
see some clustering around the $6.00 price point. Nevertheless, the ma-
jor driver seems to be the normatively weighted focal points. 
Magnatune does not display the price paid by any individual cus-
tomers or confer any observable status upon contributors. Instead, the 
written signals seem to trigger two discrete norms: first, a norm of con-
forming to the behavior of others, evoked by “typical,” and perhaps even 
by “better than average”; second, the norm of generosity. Given the ab-
sence of any social signal within this system, the behavior is likely most 
consistent with a self-signaling, warm glow, or norm compliance model 
of motivation. They allow purchasers to construct an identity as someone 
who is “typical,” “better than average,” or “generous.” 
3. Asymmetrical Payments 
Magnatune purchasers exhibit significant asymmetry in price selec-
tion. In contrast to Siberry’s model, where 28% of revenue is generated 
through purchases of $3 or more per song, only 11% of revenue is gen-
erated from purchasers that pay $12 or more per album. Site design 
could account for the difference. Unlike Siberry’s pricing scheme, Mag-
natune caps its payment scale at $18, and does not provide purchasers 
with a means for exceeding that amount. It is unclear from the data 
whether the $18 maximum, with the accompanying framing of “we love 
you,” creates a focal point around which extremely generous purchasers 
would still collect absent the constraint, or whether Magnatune would 
earn more money if it allowed purchasers to input their own price at the 
top of the scale, thereby capturing some additional hyper-generous con-
tributions. In any event, most of Magnatune’s revenue comes from 
purchasers seeking to behave as an “average” purchaser. 
                                                                                                                      
But see Henry S. Farber, Reference-Dependent Preferences and Labor Supply: The Case of 
New York City Taxi Drivers, 98 Am. Econ. Rev. 1069, 1069–82 (2008) (using data from New 
York City Taxi Drivers to test a model that provides evidence suggesting that reference-
dependent preferences play a limited role).  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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Figure 9 
 
Histograms showing the percentage of total revenue on Magnatune from 
each album bin. 
 
C. Jonathan Coulton—Individual Artist Developing Cooperative 
Relationship with Fans 
Smaller-scale artists are also pursuing independent distribution of 
their works through cooperative relationships with fans. Although coop-
erative distribution in this case may not involve direct monetary 
payment, what we see in these relationships is that fans are making other 
contributions in the form of time, labor, marketing, and artistic contribu-
tions. As with the voluntary payment schemes we analyze, artists who 
successfully build supportive fan communities employ a range of design 
levers that are worthy of close analysis. 
Jonathan Coulton is a Brooklyn-based singer and songwriter who 
produces and sells his music independently.
123 The hub of Coulton’s op-
eration is his personal website, JonathanCoulton.com, where he 
communicates with fans, gives away free songs, and sells digital 
downloads.
124 In addition to his personal site, Coulton also sells his work 
through traditional outlets like Rhapsody, iTunes, and Amazon.com.
125 
                                                                                                                      
 123.  See  The JoCo Primer—General Info,  JonathanCoulton.com, http:// 
www.jonathancoulton.com/primer/info/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2010). 
 124.  See id. 
 125.  The JoCo Primer—Getting Music,  JonathanCoulton.com, http://www. 
jonathancoulton.com/primer/get/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2010). BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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Coulton’s website includes his online store, where he offers roughly 
one-third of his music for free download, with a recommended price of 
one dollar per track.
126 The digital copies are DRM-free and come in 
high-quality formats.
127 All songs are sold under a Creative Commons 
license, which grants consumers the right to share copies for non-
commercial use (among other permissions), thus empowering his fans to 
promote his music and broaden his fan base, but also making any pay-
ment on the site strictly “voluntary,” as it is not illegal for users to share 
copies.
128 
Coulton also offers another more unusual transactional option to his 
fans—his online store invites fans who previously copied his music 
without paying (using file-sharing networks or burning copies of his 
CDs) to make a contribution.
129 He frames this donation option under the 
heading “Already Stole It?” and allows fans to contribute by purchasing 
a robot, monkey, or banana icon with an accompanying message to the 
artist (for example, “Many thanks for the awesome songs JC!” or “$10 
for a monkey! When will it be delivered?”).
130 
In contrast to the two other study sites, Coulton’s entire distribution 
and production effort is highly collaborative. He extends cooperation 
beyond the storefront. Coulton’s fans organize and promote live shows, 
promote his music across the web, and even perform more mundane 
functions (one fan reformatted Coulton’s catalogue for karaoke compati-
bility, while another designed free graphics for Coulton’s digital 
albums).
131 Many fans have created music videos with his work and 
posted them on YouTube.
132 Coulton also maintains constant communica-
tion with his fans through both his blog and regular email contact, 
responding to each and every one of more than one hundred emails he 
receives daily.
133 The site also provides extensive forums where fans 
                                                                                                                      
 126.  The MP3 Store, JonathanCoulton.com, http://www.jonathancoulton.com/store/ 
downloads/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2010). 
 127.  See id. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. Fans who purchase icons are considered members of the “JoCo Golden Circle.” 
Id.  
 131.  See Spektugalo, JoCo UltraStar Karaoke Songs Voting,  JoCo Forums (Nov. 8, 
2008), http://www.jonathancoulton.com/forums/comments.php?DiscussionID=945; The JoCo 
Primer—More Awesomeness,  JonathanCoulton.com,  http://www.jonathancoulton.com/ 
primer/more/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2010). 
 132.  Jonathan Coulton,  YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query= 
jonathan+coulton&aq=f (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). 
 133.  Clive  Thompson,  Sex, Drugs and Updating Your Blog, N.Y. Times, May 13, 2007, 
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introduce themselves, submit clips, and communicate about all things 
Coulton.
134 
Despite the fact that much of his material is available for free, Coul-
ton earns about $90,000 annually from voluntary donations and digital 
downloads on his site.
135 This accounts for 70% of his overall revenue 
from digital downloads, with the remainder coming from iTunes and 
other online stores. Downloads represent about 40% of his overall reve-
nue. CD sales make up another 29%, and ticket sales from live shows 
18%. The final 11% comes from T-shirts, typically purchased through 
his website.
 Roughly 93% of revenues from website downloads are for 
songs that can only be downloaded directly from his site upon payment. 
These payments are “voluntary” in the sense that it would be easy and 
legal (because of his licensing practice) for fans to copy and distribute 
his music without payment. About 5.5% of store revenues are for pay-
ment for free songs (those you can download from the site itself without 
payment), and another 1.35% comes from donations of monkeys or ba-
nanas at the online store. Coulton’s case is notable for the amount of 
revenue he is earning compared with the other sites under study. 
Table 3 
  Jonathan Coulton  Magnatune  Siberry 
Revenue to Artists 
from Website 
$80–90k yearly  $8–10k yearly to 
top artists 
$33k total 
 
The difference in earnings can likely be attributed to some combina-
tion of Coulton’s relative popularity and his distribution and website 
design. We discuss the design elements of Coulton’s store in more detail 
in Part V of this Article. However, what stands out most vividly is that 
Coulton engages his fans in a more complex and multifaceted coopera-
tion dynamic, at multiple stages of his distribution strategy, apart from 
the storefront.  
The differing use of voluntary donations on Coulton’s site is also no-
table. Coulton does not offer flexible payment options within his store. 
Instead, he uses fixed prices for songs and then solicits donations, while 
allowing fans to pay the one dollar fixed price for songs.
136 The voluntary 
donation strategy, which produces 6.65% of Coulton’s revenue,
 does not 
                                                                                                                      
 134.  See  JoCo Forums, http://www.jonathancoulton.com/forums/ (last visited Oct. 8, 
2010). 
  135.  Data on Coulton’s earnings discussed in this Article is on file with the authors. 
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appear successful when compared to the 90% of revenue that Magnatune 
earns for payments of $8 or more, and with the rate of payment above 
the minimum that Siberry collects. Given the significant fan dedication 
harnessed by Coulton’s site, there is reason to believe that implementing 
a flexible payment system, rather than a donation or payment for free 
songs strategy, would enable Coulton to capture significant additional 
revenues. This recommendation will be explored further as we now look 
deeper into the design of the voluntary payment systems on each site. 
IV. Designing for Cooperation 
Our data suggest that cooperative models based on voluntary contri-
butions to a public good produce meaningful results when compared to 
industry baselines. A question of great practical significance to artists, 
and of great theoretical significance to researchers interested in systems 
designed for cooperation, is how to stabilize and extend this model so as 
to improve its performance. How do we understand users who pay for 
what they have already gotten for free? What leads people who have the 
option of getting an album for $5 to pay $8 or even $16?  
The past fifteen years have seen the emergence of a substantial 
literature studying a range of deviations from the standard rational actor 
model, and forming the foundations of an approach that provides useful 
answers to these and related questions. Well-known legal scholarship in 
this vein has spanned observational work on social norms and trust,
137 
common property regimes,
138 and experimental behavioral law and 
economics.
139 The better-known aspect of the experimental work has 
been a divergence from the predictions of rationality itself.
140 Less well-
known is work that does not take aim at cognitive failures of rationality, 
but rather challenges two core simplifications of rational actor theory 
and mechanism design, neither entailed by rationality: that individuals 
are motivated similarly, and that they are all self-interested.
141 Instead, we 
find that human beings have diverse motivational-behavioral profiles. In 
experiments, more than half act cooperatively, while a substantial 
minority, perhaps one-third, behaves as predicted by the standard 
                                                                                                                      
 137.  E.g.,  Robert C. Ellickson,  Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle 
Disputes 61, 77, 164–66, 247 (1991).  
 138.  E.g., Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (James E. Alt & Douglass C. 
North eds., 1991).  
 139.  E.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998).  
 140.  Id. 
 141.  See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Homo Reciprocans, 415 Nature 125, 126 
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rational actor theory.
142 Many are active reciprocators, responding 
cooperatively to those who cooperate, and punishing, even at a cost to 
themselves, those who behave uncooperatively.
143 Others cooperate 
unconditionally, whether because they are true altruists or solidarists, or 
because they simply prefer to cooperate and do not measure what others 
are doing.
144 In addition to the experimental work and the observational 
work on commons-based regimes and social norms, there is work in 
social psychology
145 and neuroscience on social preferences,
146 such as 
empathy
147 and solidarity, or in-group bias,
148 in the evolutionary 
biology of cooperation,
149 in management science and organizational 
sociology on new collaborative models of production,
150 in social 
                                                                                                                      
 142.  Three excellent review articles are Colin F. Camerer & Ernst Fehr, Measuring 
Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists, in 
Foundations of Human Sociality 55, 60–65 (Joseph Henrich et al. eds., 2004); Ernst Fehr 
& Herbert Gintis, Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical 
Foundations, 33 Ann. Rev. Soc. 43, 47–51 (2007); Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to 
the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1, 5–9 (1998). 
  143.  Camerer & Fehr, supra note 142, at 60–65; Fehr & Gintis, supra note 142, at 47–
51; Ostrom, supra note 142, at 5–9. 
  144.  Camerer & Fehr, supra note 142, at 60–65; Fehr & Gintis, supra note 142, at 47–
51; Ostrom, supra note 142, at 5–9.  
 145.  E.g., Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in 
The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations 33 (William G. Austin & Stephen 
Worchel eds., 1979); Toshio Yamagishi et al., Bounded Generalized Reciprocity, Ingroup 
Boasting and Ingroup Favoritism, 16 Advances Group Processes 161 (1999). 
 146.  E.g., Tania Singer et al., Empathetic Neural Responses Are Modulated by Per-
ceived Fairness of Others, 439 Nature 466, 466 (2006) (describing changes in empathy level 
based on fairness of counterparty’s play in a prisoner’s dilemma game).  
 147.  E.g.,  C. Daniel Batson,  The Altruism Question: Towards a Social-
Psychological Answer (1991). Batson’s work and responses to it produced a major contri-
bution to the literature on the psychology of empathy. More recently, there has been extensive 
work on the biological foundations of empathy. See, e.g., Paul J. Zak & Jorge A. Barraza, 
Empathy and Collective Action (Apr. 8, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1375059.  
 148.  E.g., Helen Bernhard et al., Parochial Altruism in Humans, 442 Nature 912 
(2006); Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-
Motivational Analysis, 86 Psychol. Bull. 307 (1979); Charles Efferson et al., The Coevolu-
tion of Cultural Groups and Ingroup Favoritism, 321 Sci. 1844 (2008); Henri Tajfel et al., 
Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour, 1 Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 149 (1971); Jay J. 
Van Bavel et al., The Neural Substrates of In-Group Bias: A Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging Investigation, 19 Psychol. Sci. 1131 (2008); Yamagishi et al., supra note 145.  
 149.  E.g., Martin A. Nowak, Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation, 314 Science 
1560 (2006).  
 150.  E.g.,  The Firm as a Collaborative Community: The Reconstruction of 
Trust in the Knowledge Economy (Charles Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds., 2006); Wal-
ter W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization,  in 12 
Research in Organizational Behavior 295 (Barry M. Staw & L. L. Cummings eds., 
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software and peer production online,
151 and in social network theory on 
how social dynamics influence behavior,
152 all of which provide different 
perspectives on why we cooperate, and what aspects of the systems we 
inhabit influence the degree to which we cooperate. 
It is inappropriate to claim that we can create a set of predictions 
about human behavioral responses to various design interventions under 
the claimed determinism of the traditional rational actor theory. But the 
crispness of the theory was itself overstated. It is, nonetheless, feasible to 
synthesize out of this range of materials a set of design interventions that 
we can predict with some confidence will likely improve the quality of 
cooperation.
153 
 
Communication 
Communication plays a critical role in fostering cooperation. In doz-
ens of experiments, allowing participants to communicate with one 
another predictably and reliably leads to higher levels of cooperation.
154 
Experiments also show that unstructured, fluid communication is more 
effective than simply sending canned messages. Specifically, we use 
communication to achieve several design levers discussed here, like trust 
and humanization
155 and promise to cooperate even where the promise is 
non-binding in the sense that there is no third-party enforcer.
156 In obser-
vational work too, stabilizing and routinizing communication is a central 
                                                                                                                      
 151.  E.g., Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production 
Transforms Markets and Freedom (2006); Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux 
and “The Nature of the Firm,” 112 Yale L.J. 369 (2002) [hereinafter Benkler, Coase’s Pen-
guin].  
 152.  E.g., Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large 
Social Network over 32 Years, 357 New Eng. J. Med. 370, 370–79 (2007) [hereinafter Chris-
takis & Fowler, Obesity]; James H. Fowler & Nicholas A. Christakis, Dynamic Spread of 
Happiness in a Large Social Network: Longitudinal Analysis over 20 Years in the Framing-
ham Heart Study, 337 BMJ a2338 (2008); Nobuyuki Hanaki et al., Cooperation in Evolving 
Social Networks, 53 Mgmt. Sci. 1036, 1036–50 (2007); Gregory Todd Jones, Heterogeneity 
of Degree and the Emergence of Cooperation in Complex Social Networks, 10 Emergence: 
Complexity & Org. 46, 46–54 (2008).  
 153.  See Yochai Benkler, The Penguin and the Leviathan: The Science and Practice of 
Cooperation (forthcoming 2011) (discussing implications of evolutionary, social, and psycho-
logical research to organizational, institutional, and technical design aimed at increasing 
cooperation through leveraging empathy and solidarity, fairness and norms, and reciprocal 
social dynamics).  
 154.  See, e.g., David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 7 Ra-
tionality & Soc’y 58, 58–92 (1995).  
 155.  See, e.g., Olivier Bochet et al., Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Con-
tribution Experiments, 60 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 11, 11–26.  
 156.  Olivier Bochet & Louis Putterman, Not Just Babble: Opening the Black Box of 
Communication in a Voluntary Contribution Experiment, 53 Eur. Econ. Rev. 309, 309–26 
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aspect of the new managerial processes.
157 Communication is both a dy-
namic in its own right and a mechanism for producing the other design 
levers. First, communication is a mechanism through which people come 
to see their own goals, preferences, and policies in conversation with 
others with whom they interact—a mechanism for endogenous creation 
of prosocial motivations. Communications is also a foundational, and 
often the most readily available and natural, mechanism for facilitating 
most of the other design levers. The effect of communication is a very 
robust finding in these literatures, and an obvious target for design inter-
ventions. It has a large effect in experimental work, and its routinization 
is one of the core design principles of the organizational shift to collabo-
rative models.  
 
Situational Framing 
We cannot help but think of relations within frames of reference, and 
these frames in turn shape the remainder of the decisional process. In 
sociology, Erving Goffman called this aspect of interactions “frame 
analysis.”
158 In psychology, it is often called “situational construal” or 
simply “framing.” The baseline phenomenon is the same: we cannot 
avoid interpreting a situation in which we find ourselves in social and 
cultural terms. In this model, we are already at least partly determining 
the nature of the interaction and our likely behavior in it. This aspect of 
the interaction is like a lens through which we observe reality, and which 
simply must exist; there is no unmediated mechanism of accessing a 
situation that does not go through a lens of cognitive and social-cultural 
framing. One particularly evocative experiment studied whether framing 
a game by telling the subjects they were playing “the community game” 
as opposed to telling them that they were playing “the Wall Street game” 
would make a difference.
159 The study found that under an identical pay-
off structure, about 70% of subjects told they were playing “the 
community game” cooperated for the duration of the experiments.
160 
When subjects were told that they were playing “the Wall Street game,” 
33% opened cooperatively, and the rest defected and continued to defect 
throughout the game.
161 The framing choice in this case may have 
                                                                                                                      
 157.  See, e.g., Anabel Quan-Haase & Barry Wellman, Hyperconnected Net Work: Com-
puter-Mediated Community in a High-Tech Organization, in Heckscher & Adler, supra 
note 150, at 281–333 (describing communications flows in collaborative segments of a firm).  
 158.  Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Ex-
perience 1–20 (1st ed. 1974).  
  159.  Varda Lieberman et al., The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations 
Versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoners Dilemma Game Moves, 30 Personality 
& Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1175, 1176 (2004).  
 160.  Id. at 1177. 
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informed subjects as to “the right thing to do,” or it may have acted to 
alter their predictions about what others would do, so as to make coop-
eration or defection a better strategy. But it clearly had a real effect on 
behavior of otherwise similar populations encountering otherwise identi-
cal payoffs. 
 
Empathy and Solidarity: Expanding the Set of Subjects Whose 
Utility Matters 
One of the first deviations from pure self-interest is our ability to 
care about the payoffs to particular others as individuals, and our capac-
ity to care about payoff to a group that we see as constituting at least part 
of our identity. These are, respectively, empathy and solidarity. One clear 
experimental finding is that humanization—mechanisms to assure that 
participants know and recognize the humanity of their counterparts—
improves the number of cooperators and the degree of “generosity” they 
are willing to show others.
162 Neuroscientific studies support the proposi-
tion that agents’ brains respond differently to cooperation with humans 
than to “cooperation” (that is, playing strategies that in game theory 
count as cooperative) with computers.
163 Current neuroscience and neu-
rochemical analyses suggest that this effect is quite primitive, and likely 
mediated by oxytocin uptake in the brain.
164 But treating other individu-
als as human beings generally, worthy of our concern, is only one of two 
signals of the degree to which another is worthy of our cooperation or, at 
least, is highly likely to reciprocate. The other major approach to trigger-
ing the recognition of other as close to oneself is group solidarity. There 
has been substantial work in social psychology to support the finding 
that people increase the degree to which they cooperate with strangers 
whom they perceive to be part of even very minimally-triggered solidar-
ity groups. Experimental subjects in psychological experiments show 
greater generosity to, and cooperation with, others who merely claimed 
to share their preferences to Klee paintings over Kandinsky, and vice 
versa,
165 although more robust solidarity groupings offer a more stable 
basis for sustained cooperation.
166 There continues to be substantial work 
refining the degree of solidarity present, and the extent to which it is a 
heuristic for reciprocity as opposed to something more foundational to 
                                                                                                                      
  162.  Iris Bohnet & Bruno Frey, The Sound of Silence in Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dicta-
tor Games, 38 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 43, 43, 53 (1999).  
  163.  James K. Rilling et al., A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation, 35 Neuron 395, 
395–96 (2002); James K. Rilling et al., Opposing Bold Responses to Reciprocated and Unre-
ciprocated Altruism in Putative Reward Pathways, 15 NeuroReport 2539, 2539–43 (2004).  
 164.  See Zak & Barraza, supra note 147, at 2, 14.  
 165.  See David G. Rand et al., Dynamic Remodeling of In-Group Bias During the 2008 
Presidential Election, 106 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 6187 (2009).  
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identity membership.
167 But the role of symbolically marked groups in 
fostering cooperation is substantial in scholarship in human evolutionary 
biology,
168 in particular the anthropological work on the co-evolution of 
genes and culture.
169 A similar dynamic, covered by the concept of “af-
filiation-based trust” in organizational sociology,
170 is consistent with the 
role of homophily in social networks,
171 and plays a significant role in 
organizational psychology.
172 The basic intuition is that either (a)  the 
more someone has a sense of being part of a team, the more one is will-
ing to sacrifice one’s own good for the group, or (b)  the clearer the 
“groupness” of the group, the more likely cooperative action will be re-
ciprocated. Both empathy and solidarity, and their instigation through 
face-to-face meetings or detailed descriptions of the background of par-
ticipants, are another important mechanism for design, and are directly 
part of the dynamic of recognition. 
 
Normativity: Fairness, Rights, and Norm Conformism 
In his classic Rational Fools Amartya Sen emphasized the 
importance of what he called “commitment” to human motivation, and 
the failure of economics, by and large, to account for the possibility that 
people act out of commitment.
173 Commitment should cover at least two 
distinct concerns: what is fair and what is right. Indeed, a consistent 
finding in the experimental literature is that fairness is endogenous to the 
cooperative dynamic. People care about the fair distribution of 
                                                                                                                      
 167.  See id.; see also Joachim I. Krueger & Theresa E. DiDonato, Social Categorization 
and the Perception of Groups and Group Differences, 2 Soc. & Pers. Psychol. 733, 741–45 
(2008) (exploring whether solidarity is an internalized form of identity or a shortcut people 
use to determine whether they are likely to interact with a person again, and therefore should 
cooperate with them in expectation of future reciprocity).  
 168.  See, e.g., Ernst Fehr et al., Egalitarianism in Young Children, 454 Nature 1079–
1083 (2008); Rand et al., supra note 165. 
 169.  See, e.g., Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Culture and the Evolution-
ary Process (1985); Peter J. Richerson & Robert Boyd, Not by Genes Alone: How 
Culture Transformed Human Evolution (2004).  
 170.  See Lynne G. Zucker, Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Struc-
ture, 1840–1920, 8 Res. Org. Behav. 53 (1986).  
 171.  See generally Miller McPherson et al., Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social 
Networks, 27 Ann. Rev. Soc. 415 (Aug. 2001).  
 172.  See  generally  S. Alexander Haslam,  Psychology in Organizations: The 
Social Identity Approach (2004) (claiming that fostering the creation of a social identity 
among members in an organization, in particular employees of a firm, improves organizational 
performance).  
 173.  See generally Sen, supra note 96, at 317 (arguing that standard economics fails to 
appreciate that we act in certain ways not only to advance material self-interest, but also to 
follow through on our moral commitments, including where doing so undermines our material 
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outcomes,
174 the perceived fairness of the intentions of others in the 
interactions,
175 and the fairness of the process of the interaction.
176 As we 
will see, several of the sites seek to trigger a sense of fair action, between 
fans and the artist and amongst the fans, as an element in the site design.  
In addition to fairness, many of us also care about doing what is 
right, that is to say, doing what is morally appealing. There is increasing 
work today in cognitive psychology and neuroscience covering this basic 
fact—that we have an emotional and subconscious rational need to do 
what we understand to be moral.
177 Appeals to fairness or to doing what 
is right, which we see in various tones on the music sites we study here, 
are therefore not simply irrelevant whining, but appeal directly to con-
cerns that many of us have and experience as reasons for prosocial 
action. 
In addition to seeking to do what is fair and what is right, we also 
have a widespread practice of doing what is just plain normal; that is, 
conforming to social norms.
178 The literature on social norms in law gen-
erally deals with long-standing, usually tight-knit communities, which 
combine many of the design levers we describe here.
179 When contem-
plating the design for systems that may be as new as a collaborative wiki 
launched yesterday, or in our case, musicians’ sites, social norms must 
play a different role. At a minimum, they refer not to long-standing in-
ternalized norms, but to instances of more-or-less clearly specified 
behavioral expectations about what counts as “cooperative” in a given 
system. Once participants know what counts as cooperation and what as 
defection, they can adjust their own actions, as well as judge the actions 
of others. In music, we have seen references to the “typical” or “aver-
age” amount donated, or a “suggested” price, playing this role. These 
                                                                                                                      
 174.  See Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 99, at 208 (“The evidence suggests that many 
people are strongly motivated by other-regarding preferences, and that concerns for fairness 
and reciprocity cannot be ignored in social interactions.”).  
 175.  See id. at 224-29; see also Armin Falk et al., On the Nature of Fair Behavior, 41 
Econ. Inquiry 20, 20-26 (2003) (describing experiments in which subjects were confronted 
with outcomes that were unfair, but where it was sometimes clear that the other party had no 
intention of treating them unfairly, and sometimes that the unfair treatment was the product of 
intentional action, and showing that subjects responded differently to unfair intentions, cumu-
lative to unfair outcomes). 
 176.  See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 
30 Crime & Just. 283, 284 (“[P]eople’s reactions to legal authorities are based to a striking 
degree on their assessments of the fairness of the process by which legal authorities make 
decisions and treat members of the public.”).  
 177.  See generally Hauser, supra note 97 (reviewing extensive literature on the cogni-
tive, emotional, neuroscientific components, and processes underlying moral capacities).  
 178.  Ellickson, supra note 137, at 130, 149–55; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, 
Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 343–52 (1998).  
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serve as Schelling coordination norms,
180 providing a focal point for 
coordinating behavior. Beyond that, they can be explicitly stated expec-
tations about behavior, like the purely norm-based system that anchored 
Wikipedia and made it unique among cooperation models in its early 
days. There is evidence that norms that are self-consciously chosen by a 
group enjoy high adherence with minimal enforcement requirements.
181 
Where these norms evoke background norms that are already culturally 
ingrained, they may enjoy the status of those already internalized norms, 
or the norms can themselves be the object of enforcement through an-
other design lever, punishment.  
 
Trust and Authenticity 
Trust is the subject of its own immense literature, and has been used 
in many different ways.
182 Often, particularly in computer science, it is 
used to characterize the success of a system that removes the possibility 
of human defection or error.
183 That is the purpose of trusted computing 
platforms. When used thus, “trust” is not a design lever at all, but rather a 
description of the outcome of a system, which signifies confidence it its 
performance. Trust as a design lever should be seen as an attitude or belief 
of agents, not a condition they inhabit. It is a belief about how others in the 
system will behave in the absence of constraint. That is, whether these 
others are likely to be harmful or helpful to the trusting agent when not 
forced to be helpful, or prevented from being harmful, by the system it-
self.
184 Trust here means a factual belief held by individuals about the state 
                                                                                                                      
  180.  Thomas Schelling introduced the idea of a focal point for coordination in Thomas 
Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 54–55 (1960).  
 181.  Elinor Ostrom, Roy Gardner & James Walker, Rules, Games, and Common 
Pool Resources (1994).  
 182.  See generally Trust & Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experi-
mental Research (Elinor Ostrom & James Walker eds., 2005) (reviewing current work on 
trust); Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Diego Gambetta ed., 1998) 
(representing one of the earliest collections emphasizing trust); Iris Bohnet, Bruno S. Frey & 
Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding 
Out, 95 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 131 (2001) (analyzing the dynamics of trust over time given vary-
ing institutional arrangements); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective 
Action, and Law, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 71 (2003) (providing the first major analysis of how the 
experimental literature on trust and reciprocity intersects with legal design).  
 183.  See Helen Nissenbaum, Will Security Enhance Trust Online, or Supplant It? in 
Trust and Distrust Within Organizations: Emerging Perspectives, Enduring Ques-
tions, Russell Sage Publications 155–88 (R. Kramer & K. Cook eds., 2004), available at 
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/trust.pdf.  
 184.  There is increasing evidence that this “state of mind” understanding of trust (as 
opposed to a “state of affairs” concept) is mediated in the brain by oxytocin uptake. Zak & 
Barraza, supra note 147, at 2, 12. For our purposes, the process is less important than the 
extent to which it reinforces that trust as a design lever should be understood as a subjective 
state of mind of agents in a system—a state that can be developed and aided by the system 
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of the social system they occupy. Thus, we treat it differently than nor-
mativity. Trust as we use it here is not about the value of being 
trustworthy, rather, it is about constructing a system in which people can 
reasonably believe that some substantial number of others will not take 
advantage of them whenever they can. Constructing a system that builds 
this sense of trust will usually be facilitated by breaking down coopera-
tive actions into observable chunks, where participants can lower their 
exposure to others while, for example, observing their proclivities to co-
operate or defect. A subset, or a requirement of trust, is that the person 
constructing the cooperative system is regarded as an authentic actor. 
The basic insight is simple: empty promises of community and coopera-
tion may trick others for a short time, but not over the long term. An 
artist or label that wishes to engage a cooperative dynamic will need to 
make a credible commitment and behave in a way that authentically ex-
hibits trustworthiness as a stable characteristic, as well as exhibiting trust 
in other players. 
 
Transparency and Reputation 
Another important design element, the transparency of a system, 
bears powerfully on the issues of both trust and punishment. Critically, 
many of the other design features depend on participants knowing who 
did what, to and with whom, to what effect, and by which mechanism. 
Recognition of this dependence lies behind the argument that biologists 
Nowak and Sigmund make about the evolutionary impact of moral ac-
counting (though they did not call it that); such accounting, they suggest, 
was necessary to sustain indirect reciprocity, which in turn may have 
been the driving force behind the evolution of human intelligence.
185 
Whether or not they are correct, studies in experimental economics typi-
cally show that games in which subjects can develop and communicate 
reputations lead to cooperation more quickly and robustly than anony-
mous games.
186 Similarly, reputation systems play a significant role in 
social software platforms, ranging from commercial systems like eBay 
and Amazon.com,
187 to the wide range of commons-based peer produc-
tion projects that deploy the possibility of creating a stable locus for 
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reputation, and observable behavior and opinion, as a major design 
element.
188 
 
Autonomy/Efficacy 
There is significant psychological literature suggesting that people 
need a personal sense of competence or efficacy in their actions, and 
pursue activities that satisfy that need.
189 A central aspect of the reforms 
initiated by the Toyota Production System had to do with decreasing the 
number of process engineers, and locating greater autonomy to define 
the specifics of execution of the task at hand in the hands of employees 
in teams, on the line.
190 This need for autonomy and personal efficacy 
then plays an important role in limiting the efficacy of reward and pun-
ishment as complementary, as opposed to competing, methods of 
assuring cooperation. Efforts to assure and visibly permit personal 
autonomy, and to illuminate the efficacy of contributions, appear to be 
important to stabilizing levels of contribution. 
 
Calculation: Punishment, Reward, Crowding Out and Cost 
The first set of design levers all operate at the level of intrinsic moti-
vations. That is, they cause participants to want to cooperate for reasons 
that are internal to their own psychological and social needs and desires, 
rather than in response to external rewards or constraints. However, both 
the observational and experimental work suggest a significant diversity 
in motivational profiles, and a substantial presence of selfish actors. 
Thus, stable cooperation systems require extrinsic motivations to keep in 
line those not driven to cooperate by intrinsic motivations, and to prevent 
the unraveling of cooperation in those situations (which are not all in-
stances of cooperation) where the presence of selfish actors can 
undermine the efficacy, fairness, solidarity, or any of the other mecha-
nisms that might sustain cooperation among cooperators, even in the 
presence of defectors. The presence and design of mechanisms for disci-
plining and punishing defectors are therefore important to the overall 
design of cooperation platforms. The experimental literature finds that 
(a) with the right design, reciprocators can solve the second-order public 
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goods problem of punishment without intervention from an external 
body, such as the state or management,
191 but (b) punishment can back-
fire if it is not properly designed, leading to deterioration.
192 It is 
important to understand that punishment does not collapse the analysis 
back to selfish rationality. It is neither necessary (we see cooperation 
without it) nor sufficient (we see instances where it reduces cooperation, 
probably through crowding out) to explain cooperation. It can impose 
such great costs on groups that the game is not worth the candle.
193 In 
addition, the degree to which its effects are beneficial or detrimental var-
ies among cultures.
194 But it remains one design lever available to 
systems designers to improve compliance by selfish actors with the co-
operative behavior of the other agents in the system. While punishment 
has been studied much more extensively, reward systems have a similar 
and symmetric structure—participants pay a cost to keep the more self-
interested behavior of others in line with the common good. Analytically, 
rewards are merely negative punishments. They also have the benefit of 
not triggering spirals of mutual punishment. 
The ambiguous effects of punishment bring to the fore one more 
design focus, or constraint: the phenomenon of crowding out, or the non-
severability of motivational vectors. Crowding out refers to the situation 
in which an intervention in one motivational subsystem (most impor-
tantly, affecting material interests through explicit incentives treatments, 
in the form of reward or punishment), leads to opposite effects in other 
motivational subsystems (such as affecting commitment to a project, or 
moral commitment to a behavior).
195 Intra-system crowding out refers to 
situations where use of one design lever reduces the efficacy of another. 
For example, the introduction of punishment can, under certain circum-
stances, crowd out trust, and thereby undermine, rather than improve, 
cooperation.
196 From the psychological literature, we know that even ex-
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  192.  Armin Falk et al., Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions, 73 Econometrica 
2017, 2028–29 (2005); Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on 
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Jegen, Motivational Interactions: Effects on Behavior, Samuel Bowles, Policies Designed for 
Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine “The Moral Sentiments”: Evidence from Economic 
Experiments, 320 Science 1605 (2008); 63/64 Annales d’Économie et de Statistique 
131, 149 (2001).  
 196.  Toshio  Yamagishi,  The Provision of a Sanctioning System as a Public Good, 51 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 110, 114 (1986).  BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
Fall 2010]  Everything in Its Right Place  49 
 
plicit rewards can trigger the crowding out effect, but not as powerfully, 
and that they may be susceptible to framing that will treat them as non-
controlling rewards.
197 Inter-system crowding out can occur when one 
tries to “mix-and-match” elements from cooperative systems with ele-
ments from other systems, such as market mechanisms. There is a broad 
literature on crowding out caused by the introduction of money into oth-
erwise cooperation-based interactions.
198 For the kinds of systems we are 
studying here, crowding out presents a particularly salient problem, be-
cause the object of cooperation is payment in money. Given that we 
observe many mixed systems, such as open source software innovation 
and the introduction of cooperative models into firms, mixing is not im-
possible. But it requires attention to the interactions between the 
motivational and organizational forms, rather than a simple assumption 
of additive effect.
199 
In addition to punishment and reward, which operate primarily on 
individuals who otherwise might not cooperate because of intrinsic 
drives, it is important to remember that the existence of prosocial moti-
vations does not exclude consideration of personal costs and benefits. 
The point is not that large numbers of us are altruists irrespective of cost. 
Rather, it is that large numbers of us have prosocial motivations—regard 
for others owing to empathy and solidarity, or regard for the normative 
implications of what we do, in addition to our other cost-benefit consid-
erations. It is not surprising, therefore, that the cost of cooperation 
affects its levels and the number of people who cooperate. In experi-
ments, subjects will cooperate more when the cost of doing so is lower, 
such as when the opportunity cost of cooperating in a prisoner’s di-
lemma is lower because of payoff structure,
200 and in real life we see 
improvements in peer production online when the task has been modu-
larized or chunked into sufficiently fine-grained modules to make the 
cost of contribution smaller.
201 
 
Social Dynamics 
There is a growing body of research today in social network effects 
on behavior. It turns out, for example, that our own obesity is affected by 
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whether our friends and relatives have recently become obese.
202 The 
mechanism is not altogether clear, but it appears that there is at least 
some role for benchmarking and imitation—that is, we judge our own 
behavior and outcomes by comparing ourselves to others in our social 
neighborhood.
203 Allowing participants to observe each other (transpar-
ency), and to selectively form and break attachments with people who 
are more-or-less cooperative (in order to increase the number of interac-
tions they have with cooperators as opposed to defectors), is therefore 
also a valuable design feature in enabling groups of cooperators to stabi-
lize and provide mutual support. 
Within social dynamics, leadership is important. This conclusion 
does not come out of the experimental work, which does not examine 
leadership, but it is a consistent feature of the organizational sociology,
204 
is often emphasized in the study of open source software,
205 and has been 
an object of study for field studies of online cooperation as well.
206 It is 
important to recognize, however, that “leadership” does not mean “hier-
archy.” Rather, what we see in the observational work is that people 
contribute at widely diverse levels, and systems need to be designed to 
accommodate these divergent patterns and to find fulfilling ways for par-
ticipants to be recognized for their asymmetric contribution, often 
through greater say in the collective governance of the enterprise, or 
through symbolic means of expressing honor and respect. Moreover, for 
at least some people, it is precisely the seeking of positional power, and 
recognition of leadership, that can drive generous and prosocial behav-
ior. The role of gift giving as a modality of asserting dominance, or 
agonistic giving, is widespread in the anthropology of the gift,
207 in fund-
raising practices where public exhibition of one’s gift is a form of 
asserting status, and we also see it in some, but by no means all, online 
cooperation sites. 
The following, then, is a list of the above design levers, or design 
considerations: 
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Communication 
Situational Framing 
Expanding the utility function:  
Empathy 
Solidarity 
Normativity 
Fairness 
Moral commitment 
Norm compliance or conformism 
Trust 
Trust and authenticity 
Transparency and reputation 
Autonomy/efficacy 
Calculation 
Punishment and reward 
Crowding out 
Cost 
Social dynamics 
Social network effects 
Leadership and asymmetry 
No list of fourteen potential loci of design intervention can hope to 
provide the determinism implied by simpler models of human motiva-
tion and system intervention. For readers who seek the comfort of 
analysis capable of stating “if you do X, you will increase rewards 
through action A, and therefore increase compliance with the expected 
behavior,” what follows in Part V will be disappointing. Other readers 
may recognize that human motivations and social, psychological, and 
cultural interactions are extremely complex phenomena. They cannot be 
reduced to a simple “if you do X then A will follow” without enormous 
loss of information. Readers who accept this reality may be more patient 
as we explore how the design levers still provide substantial advantages 
over an approach that simply recognizes the complexity of human action 
and calls for highly contextual analysis. In Part V, we suggest that the BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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design levers indeed offer some greater purchase to explaining and pre-
dicting results, provide analysis of diverse design decisions, and offer 
suggestions for design improvements in discrete cooperative activities—
like voluntary payment music websites.  
V. Use of Design Levers in Interface 
Design in Study Sites 
This section seeks to demonstrate how the levers can be imple-
mented in practice by analyzing the study sites. In so doing, we highlight 
the differences in design choices across the sites, and gain insight into 
which designs are more conducive to cooperation. Naturally, the sites 
presented here represent only one set of ways in which the levers could 
be implemented. 
For example, a site might aim to build empathy among users and 
humanize an artist by detailing an artist’s personal story and enabling the 
artist to communicate with fans through a blog or email. Alternatively, 
rather than aggregating and publishing this information unilaterally, a 
website might give fans tools to upload testimonials and stories of an 
artist. Both mechanisms achieve a similar goal of humanizing the artist, 
but they do so through different design interventions. Here we detail and 
compare the design decision employed on each of the study sites while 
also suggesting alternative implementations.  
 
Communication 
Despite the salience of communication as a cooperation-enabler, 
most communication on Magnatune and on Siberry’s site is unidirec-
tional. The sites are not built as social networks with active profile 
messaging, internal emailing, chat rooms, or other user interaction. In-
stead, messaging flows from the owners to fans, and there is little robust 
fan-to-fan or artist-to-fan dialogue. On Magnatune, for example, the site 
founder keeps a blog where he regularly messages the community, but 
community posting on blog posts is limited.
208 
By contrast, Coulton’s site includes active community forums that 
contain over one thousand discussion threads.
209 The forums are adminis-
tered by volunteers and require all contributors to sign in before 
posting.
210 As predicted by cooperation theory, what we see in these fo-
rums is a community that actively discusses its relationship to Coulton 
and to the broader project of cooperative music distribution. The fans 
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engage with the various payment options that Coulton presents and share 
their views on acceptable behavior.  
For example, in a thread called “Payday,” fans directly respond to 
Coulton’s payment proposition:  
Lots of [my music] is freely available depending on how techni-
cal you are—you can get all of it for free if you really try. But 
please remember I do make a living this way, so if you like what 
you hear I’d certainly appreciate you throwing a little payment 
or donation my way. If you can’t afford it, for goodness sake 
please send copies of everything to all of your friends.
211 
The responses to this request range in character. Here are a few re-
sponses seen in the “Payday” thread:  
“People should donate/pay what they feel the music deserves, 
and if you can’t afford to pay money, it is ok to pay in your time 
and effort in spreading the word of how awesome this music is.” 
“Well people that enjoy his music, download it, and never give a 
penny should feel guilty. If you can afford an internet connec-
tion, you can afford to pay something.” 
“His intentions seem pretty clear to me. He’d like you to pay for 
it, but he’d rather you take it for free than not take it at all. Just 
spread it around, and he knows eventually money (poop?) will 
come back to him. I’ve given him money for music & concert 
tickets, but I always sort of feel like I haven’t given him nearly 
enough to cover all the entertainment he’s provided me. I do 
‘promote’ him by giving people CD’s, sending youtube [sic] 
links, talking about his music to anyone who’ll listen, 
etc......[sic]”
212 
What we see throughout these comments and the broader discussion 
is that fans use the forums to present themselves and identify as part of 
the cooperative community. The community tools are then used to dis-
cuss the question of voluntary payment and define norms and practices. 
It is thus the provisioning of the communications tools that allows this 
conversation about fairness to develop and enables fans to see them-
selves as connected to a broader community of purchasers.  
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Situational Framing 
All three of the sites under study frame the exchange of music as more 
than a monetary transaction. Purchasing music becomes an opportunity to 
participate in something greater. It is a chance to support an artist, to 
give a gift, and to remedy the problems in the music marketplace. 
That said, the frame used and the method of communicating the 
frame differs from site to site. On Magnatune, visitors are invited to take 
part in the launch of a new music label and a new way of distributing 
music. The framing takes place through the Magnatune tagline, “We are 
not evil . . . . You get great music, musicians get 50%,” the labeling of 
the different levels of payment, and the founder’s detailed explanation of 
Magnatune’s creation.
213 Specifically, after detailing the difficulties his 
wife experienced as an independent musician, Buckman explains: 
I thought: why not make a record label that has a clue? That 
helps artists get exposure, make at least as much money [sic] 
they would make with traditional labels, and help them get fans 
and concerts. 
. . . .  
If you think Magnatune is a worthy goal, please support it. There 
are powerful forces who want it to fail, so I need your help if 
this is going to work.
214 
Coulton, by contrast, takes fans out of a pure transactional context 
by framing the site as a music community. He invites fans to participate 
throughout the site but then warns, “listen to my music, be part of my 
community, but remember I make my living this way.”
215 Furthermore, 
rather than emphasizing duty or obligation, Coulton expresses apprecia-
tion for contributions and invites reciprocity. For example, when he 
explains how fans can “get music” he writes, “[i]f you like what you 
hear I’d certainly appreciate you throwing a little payment or donation 
my way. If you can’t afford it, for goodness sake please send copies of 
everything to all of your friends.”
216 
As with Coulton and Magnatune, Siberry frames the relationship as 
one of implicit obligation. The site characterizes the free download op-
tion as a “gift from the artist,”
217 signaling that, as in any gift context, a 
formal quid pro quo is neither required nor expected, but a moral and 
social obligation is incurred. This framing may offer a mixed signal: on 
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the one hand, the artist leaves the decision on contribution entirely to the 
consumer, without threat of punishment, shaming, or even disapproval—
an uninhibited expression of trust in those that visit the online store. On 
the other hand, as anyone who has received a gift knows, the trust comes 
with an expectation and a social performance of reciprocation. Signals 
on the site are further mixed because, contrary to the decidedly non-
market framing of the site overall, Siberry calls her “standard” payment 
rate a “market price,” and describes her system as having a “flexible 
price interface.”
218 This designation likely misaligns the framing of con-
tributions on her site, at least to some extent. Future work would be 
required to examine whether a more tightly aligned set of messages 
would result in lowering the percentage of non-participants. It is hard to 
tease out, however, whether the relatively high level of non-participation 
we observed on Siberry’s site is a result of her site design’s capacity to 
actually capture and observe those non-participants (unlike Coulton and 
Magnatune), or whether the levels of non-participation are affected by 
the mixed messaging. 
 
Empathy and Solidarity 
The sites vary in the degree to which they enable empathy and soli-
darity. In all three sites, the founders use personal messaging, 
photographs, and stories to humanize themselves and the artists. For ex-
ample, Magnatune uses a video to introduce artists.
219 It gives the artists 
an opportunity to present themselves, explain why they joined, and speak 
about what Magnatune represents to them.  
Coulton also induces solidarity through his framing of the site. How-
ever, while all three sites do a decent job of building solidarity and 
empathy between the founder and fans, or between artists and fans 
(Magnatune), only Coulton enables building of solidarity among the fans 
themselves. Magnatune in particular seems to seek ingroup solidarity in 
the face of an outgroup threat, with Buckman’s plea for help in the face 
of unnamed outsiders who are resisting Magnatune’s efforts.
220 Solidar-
ity, measured in the experimental literature as ingroup bias, may well 
have its roots in inter-group conflict,
221 of which the oppositional trigger 
is a telltale sign. 
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Given the literature on solidarity, it is possible that both Magnatune 
and Sheeba could enhance levels of contribution results if they enabled 
fans to build “teams” or “groups” that would participate and contribute 
as teams, as part of the larger enterprise of supporting the artists. There 
is, however, some uncertainty about the extent to which this effect is 
gender biased and male specific.
222 Either site could design for solidarity-
creation by enabling Coulton-style forums. However, merely allowing 
fans to post pictures of themselves, submit comments, or express their 
own identities and connection to the site might be enough to cultivate 
this “team spirit.” 
 
Normativity: Fairness, Moral Commitment and Norm Compliance or 
Conformism 
All three sites appeal heavily to a sense of fairness and community 
norms. However, what distinguishes the communities is whether the sites 
attempt to set norms of fairness independently or whether they invite 
users to consider their own sense of fairness when deciding how much to 
contribute.  
For example, Siberry’s explicit (and idiosyncratic) pitch, displayed 
on the site’s “Frequently Asked Questions” page, appeals to core fairness 
principles even as it makes clear that the freedom to decide compensa-
tion questions rests with the consumer. She writes:  
WHAT ARE SELF-DETERMINED TRANSACTIONS?  
A flexible interface that accommodates all transaction needs.  
It ensures that money (or lack of it) never comes between the 
artist and someone who might be lifted by their offering.  
NOT donations  
NOT pay-what-you-can  
NOT guilt-trips  
NOT tests of your integrity  
NOT giving music away for free  
IS a flexible price interface  
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IS respectful of our wider senses of balance  
IS non-policing  
IS a way of treating others as we would like to be treated  
IS trusting that the world is good and so are people  
IS acknowledgement that our creative gifts are just that. Gifts to 
us. Wanting to share them is the ultimate thank you back to the 
source.  
OK, BUT HOW DO I DO IT?  
You decide what feels right to your gut. $100? $20? $1? Let 
your gut guide you. If you download as a gift from artist, per-
haps you’ll buy an extra CD at another band’s concert. Or if you 
don’t go with your gut feeling, you might sleep poorly, wake up 
grumpy, put your shoes on backwards and fall over. Whatever. 
You’ll know what to do.
223 
This appeal implicates several insights from the cooperation litera-
ture. It explicitly eschews enforcement, emphasizing “non-policing,” and 
the artist’s desire to avoid imposition of “guilt trips.” It explicitly evokes 
fairness on the golden rule model, trust, and reciprocal gift giving. 
Moreover, it attempts to trigger customer behavior that coheres with 
one’s own understanding of what constitutes fair conduct, rather than 
imposing an external behavioral norm.  
The site prominently displays the average price per song, which may 
destabilize the non-market character of the interaction, but also effec-
tively translates the actual consumer behavior into a guidepost for 
fairness. The notion here appears to be that publication of summary sta-
tistics sets an expectation of community behavior that then influences all 
other transactions on the site. As the coordinating price point displayed 
on the site is reflective of actual community behavior (as opposed to a 
unilateral command from the artist), the average price may perform a 
normative function, in the sense of a clear signal for imitation and con-
formist norm compliance. 
As discussed in the Magnatune results section, clustering of the ma-
jority of payments around a value labeled “typical” is evidence of how 
behavior can be influenced by reporting and tagging of community 
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payment trends. On Magnatune, the “typical” price reported also reflects 
the average price seen in the data. 
In addition to the tagging of the payment options in normative terms 
(i.e., typical, generous, very generous) Buckman also tries to establish a 
norm of “fair sharing,” permitting and encouraging users to share only 
three copies of the music they download.
224 The “give three copies” norm 
stands in contrast to industry norms, where file sharing is generally 
treated as illegal and even immoral. The norm also differs from those of 
file-sharing communities, where unabashed and unlimited sharing is of-
ten seen not only as acceptable but also as beneficial to the artist. In 
these ways, the norm is more permissive than the baseline in much of the 
music sharing world. But the “give three copies” policy is also more re-
strictive than one more baseline: the actual legal license that governs the 
relationship.  
Because all Magnatune files come with a Creative Commons li-
cense, users are legally permitted to share them without limits, as long as 
they do not do so commercially. Yet Buckman does not mention the legal 
standard. Instead, he “overlays” his own norm of what constitutes “fair 
sharing” of Magnatune files. It is unknown whether Magnatune users 
recognize whether this “give three copies” norm is in fact a norm rather 
than the legal standard, and, indeed, a norm that is more restrictive than 
their actual rights. Nevertheless, Buckman admits to receiving regular 
letters from users who, in an attempt to scrupulously “play by the rules,” 
seek guidance regarding the official sharing policy.
225 
 
Trust, Authenticity, Transparency, and Reputation  
Although both Magnatune and Siberry’s site display some aggre-
gated sales data, none of the sites approach full transparency with 
respect to revenues. In addition, none of the sites provide high-paying 
contributors or active fans with a clear platform for developing a reputa-
tion or identity on the site. In this regard, the sites do not seek to harness 
social signaling, “Big Man” giving dynamics, or the generation of a 
reputation for generosity. All three sites do make a point of communicat-
ing trust in their respective fan bases and therefore invite trust in 
themselves and their sites. 
At a macro level, by making all of her music available for free, 
Siberry makes herself vulnerable and expresses a tacit trust in the good 
will of consumers. The site’s basic approach signals to consumers that 
the artist carries a certain level of confidence in their willingness to con-
tribute to her well-being. 
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Magnatune’s framing of its “give three copies” policy also seeks to 
foster trust. In detailing the reasoning behind the policy, Buckman ex-
plains that he created the policy in part to reciprocate and reward 
customers who emailed to ask about making copies.
226 Responding to 
“[a]ren’t you worried I’ll abuse this,” Buckman writes: 
No, because you’ve always had the capability to copy anything 
you bought from Magnatune: we don’t believe in copy protec-
tion and we think you’re honest, otherwise you wouldn’t be 
bothering to read this! 
Dishonest people can always abuse the system. Rather, we want 
to reward all the honest people who truly want to do the right 
thing. 
If you abuse our generosity, we’re not going to break down your 
door and throw you in jail. We just want you to feel a little guilty 
about it <grin>.  
We’re trusting you to do the right thing, and introduce new peo-
ple to the music you love. You’ll feel good about it, your friends 
will thank you, and you’ll help Magnatune prosper.
227 
It is within this exchange between Buckman and his customers that 
the use of trust as a design tool is clearly exemplified. What is no less 
important is the attention to the interplay between norms and humaniza-
tion. The addition of “<grin>” in this paragraph acts to moderate the 
moral claim made on the other, to humanize it, and to make it a low-
threat demand. The site invokes “guilt” and internalized norms, but 
diffuses the potential crowding out or negative effect of feeling forced 
with a “<grin>.” 
 
Autonomy/Efficacy  
Coulton’s delegation of duties such as arranging his performances, 
and his responsiveness to successful organizational efforts,
228 enable his 
fans to feel that their relationship has an effect on Coulton. However, the 
other sites do not appear to utilize the autonomy or efficacy levers. Mag-
natune and Siberry could communicate the impact of voluntary 
contributions more clearly to induce deeper cooperation. Matching-type 
gifts (for example, “if $X would be raised in Y time, I will donate $Z”) 
are one example of an efficacy-enhancing design intervention. As it 
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stands, the average fan has no way of assessing whether the community 
contributions as a whole are sufficient to support Siberry or the Mag-
natune artists.  
 
Calculation: Punishment/Reward, Crowding out, and Cost 
None of the sites under study use punishment or reward systems to 
influence behavior. The cost of participation and potential for crowding 
out, however, differs from site to site.  
Siberry and Coulton may be triggering some level of motivational 
“crowding out” through their pricing schemes. The $0.99 price data 
point (labeled on Siberry’s site as the “market price”)
229 and the $1.00 
price point
230 frame the artist-customer relationship as an arms length 
market exchange, reminiscent of iTunes and other fixed-price online mu-
sic stores. The $0.99 and $1.00 frames thus orient the customer to a 
standard recording industry convention, and could deter some customers 
from considering more substantial contributions. Coulton and Siberry 
would potentially drive higher contributions and avoid presenting their 
music as part of a broader commoditized industry if they eliminated 
prices that trigger clear market associations for music consumers.  
The marginal transaction cost of contribution relative to download-
ing may also limit Coulton and Siberry’s revenues. At Magnatune, 
consumers must pay something in order to download high-quality album 
files. Thus, if they want music at all, they must already take out a credit 
card or log into PayPal, and are within the payment context when decid-
ing whether to contribute more than the minimum. The incremental 
transaction costs associated with adding a couple dollars to the purchase 
price are negligible. Radiohead employed a similar approach, requiring 
purchasers to pay the minimal transaction cost of the download to obtain 
a “free” copy, making the marginal cost of contributing negligible.
231 On 
Coulton’s site, some songs require payment but provide no flexibility to 
pay more than the fixed price, whereas those songs that require no pay-
ment and give room for voluntary donation see the full cost of 
transacting borne by generous giving.
232 In Siberry’s case, any payment 
entails its full transactions cost, because all songs are also available at 
much lower transaction cost through the “gift from the artist” or “pay 
later” options.
233 
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Social Dynamics 
Finally, two of the study sites are not designed in a way that enables 
social dynamics among contributors to evolve in any significant way. 
Coulton’s forums and media contribution tools do allow “leading” fans 
to emerge and interact with the community, as demonstrated in the 
thread about online payment. However, Magnatune and Sheeba’s site 
lack the basic profile and communication tools that would allow fans to 
have an online presence. In this sense, communication tools and other 
design features (like profiles, images, etc.) can be understood as a pre-
cursor for the emergence of leadership or social dynamics on a site. It is 
therefore worth noting that the cooperation sustained on Siberry and 
Magnatune is primarily sustained due not to inter-fan social influence, 
but to the influence and leadership of the site founders, and the use of the 
other design levers discussed.  
Conclusion 
Paying for music production and distribution, like paying for the 
production of other information goods, is a classic public goods prob-
lem. Copyright law, and the industrial model of the recording industry of 
the twentieth century, provides one solution to the problem. 
However imperfect a property-like right in a market in information 
goods may be (it was Kenneth Arrow who first identified systematic im-
perfections),
234 copyright accepts the tradeoff in order to induce the 
creation of culture because, in theory, the benefits outweigh the costs. As 
digital music distribution destabilized the recording model’s core en-
tity—the disc, be it phonograph or CD—it created new opportunities for 
appropriation and threats of misappropriation, all of which have led to 
the copyright wars and the diverse legislative and judicial efforts to pre-
serve the twentieth century model of paying for music.
235 Because music 
files were small and easily transmissible over the Internet at acceptable 
fidelity, by comparison to video files, and because the industry had so 
narrowly focused its revenue streams around selling units, rather than 
public performances and multiple channel appropriation, like video pro-
duction and film, the music industry experienced the threat earlier than 
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other copyright industries, and the threat was more credibly claimed to 
be terminal.  
It is not, therefore, too fanciful to say that the threats to, and needs 
of, the music industry were the primary driving force in the rapid expan-
sion of digital copyright law: from legislation like the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act and the No Electronic Theft Act in 1998, to 
the  Napster and Grokster cases of the current decade. More creative 
thinkers have come up with novel methods for delivering money to art-
ists, including strong pre-commitment mechanisms to assure sufficient 
donations like the street performer protocol
236 and forcing mechanisms 
like a tax on Internet-related objects and services (whose proceeds would 
go to copyright holders from a central clearinghouse, based on meas-
urements of the social value of the artist’s work through market-like 
consumption measures).
237 But throughout this period, artists, cryptogra-
phers, and others were devising ways to enable artists to make a living, 
rather than permitting industry to retain its business models.  
Our study suggests that voluntary donation systems are, in fact, a po-
tentially stable alternative for providing artists with an anchor of support, 
though in most cases likely not a complete solution to the problem of 
artist compensation. However, royalties from recorded music were never 
the primary means for most musicians to make a living before the digital 
revolution. Live performances and, to a lesser extent and for fewer art-
ists, merchandising, played that role in popular music, while public 
funding and philanthropy filled some of the shortfall for classical music 
and jazz. The question from the artists’ perspective, then, is not whether 
voluntary payment systems can become a sole source of revenue, but 
whether they are a plausibly stable element in a range of strategies for 
supporting the production and distribution of music, while making an 
acceptable living. Our answer, both theoretically and practically based 
on the results of this study, is yes. 
Theoretically, copyright in particular, and property-based solutions 
to public good provisioning problems more generally, are built on an 
assumption of universal self-interest. Here, we provided a brief survey 
and synthesis of an expansive literature, theoretical, experimental, and 
observational, that challenges the realism of that assumption. Scholarly 
work across many disciplines suggests that human beings are diversely 
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motivated, and that very large portions of us reliably exhibit behaviors 
better explained by prosocial motivations than by uniform and universal 
self-interest. From this work, we have extracted a series of design levers, 
or design focal points, which seem to be associated with increased levels 
of prosociality. We have used prosociality to mean contributing to the 
provisioning of the public good, music, by paying artists, and in Coul-
ton’s case, taking on some of the costs of marketing and distribution, as 
well as performance production. 
Empirically, we have presented a unique dataset, spanning between 
three and five years, across three distinct websites, and analyzing over 
150,000 discrete transactions. Our core findings are that:  
(a) prosocial contribution levels are steady and reliable over that 
period;  
(b) depending on the design of the site, somewhere between 
20% and 60% of fans can be relied on to contribute some-
thing;  
(c)  contributions are driven, it appears, by two distinct groups—
norm followers, or normative contributors, who seek to con-
tribute what is widely perceived as the norm, or their fair 
share, and a much smaller set of hyper-generous altruists, 
who contribute sufficiently large amounts to account for a 
significant source of the revenues, though not as large a 
portion as the normative contributors;  
(d) the revenue flow generated by these contributions, even at 
the low end of participation rates, as with Siberry, is signifi-
cant when compared to industry baselines of similarly 
non-high-profile artists, and anecdotal evidence from Radio-
head and NIN suggests that the model may well scale to 
more popular artists as well;  
(e)  the sites we examine in this Article specifically eschew forc-
ing models: they trigger reciprocity by making the music 
available under a Creative Commons license that unilaterally 
disarms them from any legally forcing mechanism, and they 
do not use negative norm enforcement, through shaming or 
guilt-trip inducements; rather, they rely on explicit expres-
sions of trust, both symbolic and actual, in terms of format 
and licensing in which the music is made available; 
(f) while the sites we reviewed are successful, there is no 
exposition on “best practices,” but instead a theoretically-
informed effort to explore cooperative design; the voluntary BENKLER FINAL 3_C.DOC 12/23/2010  1:18:06 PM 
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donation model is at a very early stage of its development, 
explorations are heuristic and practical, and there is likely 
substantial room for improvement as we begin to move our 
design focus from perfecting means of control, monitoring, 
and forced pricing, to perfecting systems that engage fans 
with artists and enable prosocial dynamics to form a re-
placement system to support artists and pay for the public 
good they produce.  
Our study suggests several discrete potential improvements in the site 
design: 
 
Framing  Take site visitors out of a purely transactional/ 
commercial mindset. Clearly explain that the site and artists therein 
are supported through voluntary payments.  
 
Invite visitors to join the community and appeal to norms of fairness, 
reciprocity and trust in the site community. 
Empathy & Solidarity  Create a way for artists to humanize and introduce themselves 
through text, images, and video. 
Enable communities to form within the site—through groups or teams.  
Allow fans to post media about themselves and create identities. 
Normativity  Don’t just appeal to general norms—define what is and isn’t fair 
within a particular site. State community rules. Specify what is the 
“typical,” “above average,” or “generous” payment point, or expose 
data so that contributors can evaluate their contributions in 
comparison to others.  
Trust, Authenticity, 
Transparency, & Reputation 
Invoke the concept of trust and enable site visitors to know that both 
site owners and artists are trusting visitors to consume fairly. 
Highlight the lack of required payment or other expressions of trust. 
Reveal data on payments and revenue shares with artists to 
encourage trust of site owners. 
Autonomy / Efficacy  Enable artists to respond to requests and communications from 
fans. 
Post the results of voluntary payments and frame the impact they 
have on artists. 
Consider matching programs in which fan contributions are matched 
by other organizations or entities. 
Calculation: Punishment 
& Reward, Crowding 
Out, & Cost  
If pricing is used on the site, keep it unconventional. Don’t trigger 
market behavior by using standard market prices: i.e., $0.99. 
Minimize the cost of contributing. Require payment for processing 
and offer options for additional voluntary payment after visitors are 
already in the payment context. 
Allow multiple mechanisms for payment, so visitors can select the 
least costly option. Minimize time spent and complexity so that 
regular submission of voluntary payments is not burdensome.  
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Social Dynamics  
& Communication 
Create a structure for community leaders and representatives to 
emerge and guide the community. 
Enable bidirectional communication for all actors on the site. Employ 
social tools including email, chat, Twitter, and others to enable a fan 
culture and community to evolve. Allow fans to view and comment 
on the behavior of others. 
Enable fans to shape this environment—the visual look and feel of 
the site, and the communication tools employed.  
 
Future research should focus on experimenting with these design in-
terventions in controlled conditions and carefully monitoring outcomes. 
Doing so will produce measurable evidence as to the effect of specific 
interventions, and more concrete guidance for cooperative-systems 
builders. 
* * * 
Copyright policy in the last two decades has been driven by the in-
terests of the copyright industries, and underwritten intellectually by a 
model that suggests that musicians will not create without being paid, 
and fans will not pay without being forced to by law and technology. 
Theoretical and empirical work on prosociality, however, argues that 
these assumptions are false, or at the very least, substantially incomplete. 
There is extensive evidence that people do contribute to the public good, 
and do act generously towards each other, in ways that suggest that mu-
sicians will create music beyond its marginal money value, and more 
importantly for our purposes here, that fans will pay well beyond what 
they can be forced to pay under present and foreseeable future techno-
logical conditions. 
Taking these insights seriously requires a retreat from forcing and 
punishment as the dominant mode of financing creative production. It 
requires artists to engage their fans, and to understand themselves in a 
reciprocal relationship, rather than an entitled one. It gives us breathing 
space to experiment with new models of music production and distribu-
tion. But keeping the space for experimentation requires a technological 
and legal environment that is conducive to sharing music in social ex-
change networks, rather than in tight technical and transactional 
networks. Achieving that goal requires lawmakers and judges to resist 
the claim—typically advanced by panicked music industry lobbyists and 
lawyers—that the day on which the copyright system is loosened will 
become the day the music died.  